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Abstract
is thesis consists of two chapters exploring how even benevolent governments may
struggle to convince their citizens that they will stick to the policies that ensure the best
outcomes in equilibrium. If people believe that the government will optimally choose
a dierent policy in the event of a crisis, their reaction to that belief may in fact bring
about just such a crisis. is thesis investigates the circumstances in which these kinds of
commitment problems can be overcome.
e rst chapter is on bank resolution, where the choice between resolving insolvent
banks and bailing them out creates a time inconsistency problem. To deter banks from tak-
ing excessive risks, governments want to convince them that they will choose resolution.
However, when facing the costs of liquidating banks, governments may be tempted to bail
them out instead. By strengthening their bank resolution regimes, governments reduce
these costs, thus credibly commiing themselves to choosing resolution over bailouts.
Governments with greater resources face a more severe commitment problem. When
banks interact strategically, improving the resolution regime can eliminate equilibria in
which they coordinate on risky investment strategies.
In the second chapter, Antoine Camous and I present a theory linking the cyclicality
of scal policy to inherited public debt. When debt is low, scal policy is countercycli-
cal, in the sense that the government responds to reductions in output by cuing the tax
rate. Above a threshold level of debt, however, optimal scal policy becomes procyclical.
is creates the possibility of self-fullling crises, in which output is low because workers
expect high taxes, and the government sets high taxes because output is low. Our model
suggests why highly indebted governments might implement procyclical scal policy dur-
ing recessions, even without facing high sovereign risk premia.
i
ii
Acknowledgements
I could not have wrien this thesis, and my years at the EUI would not have been as
enjoyable, without the support of many people.
I thank my supervisor, Russell Cooper, and my second advisor, Elena Carlei, for their
astute guidance and encouragement. eir own research and teaching provided much
inspiration, and I have beneted greatly from their advice. I am also very grateful to ev-
eryone else who took the time to give feedback on my work, especially Piero Goardi,
whose support during the laer part of my PhD was invaluable.
It has been a privilege to work with Antoine Camous on the paper that forms the
second chapter of this thesis. I have been very fortunate to share the ups and downs
of studying for a PhD with him and many other wonderful classmates, including Anna
Gibert, Wojtek Paczos, Romanos Priis and Kirill Shakhnov. I am particularly glad to
have shared the “palazzo” on Via Giusti with Alastair Ball, Andre´ Gama, Abia´n Garcı´a and
Robert Goodhead (and occasionally dozens more). I owe a special thanks to Nadia Xarcha
for her support during the stresses of the job market.
I am grateful to all the faculty and sta of the EUI Economics Department who make
it such a great place in which to study and do research. For nancial support during my
PhD, I thank the taxpayers of the United Kingdom and the Marcia Whitney Scholarship
Fund.
Most of all, I thank my parents, Judith and Peter Gimber, who have always been there
for me and asked for nothing in return except that I do my best. I dedicate this thesis to
them.
London, 12 November 2015
iii
iv
Contents
Abstract i
Acknowledgements iii
1 Bank Resolution, Bailouts and the Time Inconsistency Problem 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 Examples of Bank Resolution Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 A Model of Financial Intermediation with Moral Hazard . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 e Government’s Choice of Bailouts vs. Resolution . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.2 Banks’ Temptation to Gamble with Investors’ Funds . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.3 Investors’ Choice Between Gambling and Prudent Banks . . . . . . 10
1.2.4 Optimal Investment in the Bank Resolution Authority . . . . . . . 12
1.2.5 Comparison with the Case of Costless Pre-Commitment . . . . . . 13
1.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.1 Strategic Interactions Among Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.2 Fire Sale Eects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.3 Limited Government Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.4 Production Sector with Distortionary Taxation . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2 Public Debt and the Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy 27
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 A Model of Taxpayer Coordination Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.1 Static Economy with a Balanced Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.2 Two-Period Economy with Taxes and Debt Issuance . . . . . . . . 31
2.3 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.1 Properties of the Labour Supply Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.2 Properties of the Tax Policy Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.3 Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3.4 Tax-Base and Consumption-Smoothing Eects . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4 Example with Closed-Form Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4.1 Inherited Debt and the Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy . . . . . . . . . . 45
v
2.5 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.5.1 Endogenous Government Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.5.2 Allowing for Default on Newly Issued Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.3 Private Access to International Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
vi
Chapter 1
Bank Resolution, Bailouts and the
Time Inconsistency Problem
1.1 Introduction
In the aermath of the 2007–2008 nancial crisis, new bank resolution regimes have been
enacted or proposed in several countries. In the United Kingdom, the Banking Act 2009
established a Special Resolution Regime for failing banks. In the United States, the Dodd–
Frank Act of 2010 created a new federal receivership process for failing nancial companies
deemed to pose a systemic risk. e European Union adopted the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive in 2014, along with a Single Resolution Mechanism for the euro area
as a key pillar of the banking union.
Such regimes allow for banks (and oen other nancial institutions) that are in immi-
nent danger of failure to be dealt with outside the scope of normal corporate insolvency
laws, on the grounds that this reduces the systemic risk such failures pose to the nan-
cial system. Under standard bankruptcy procedures, coordination failures among a bank’s
creditors might prevent them from maximizing the value of its remaining assets (see, for
example, Morris and Shin (2004).) Furthermore, creditors might force the bank to sell o
its assets at re sale prices, without taking into account the eect of lower asset prices
on other institutions’ balance sheets. Disorderly liquidation might therefore lead to -
nancial contagion. A normal bankruptcy procedure could also interrupt a bank’s ability
to provide payment services and other “critical functions” to its customers, with poten-
tially far-reaching implications for the economy as a whole. e intended eect of bank
resolution regimes, therefore, is to reduce the ex post social costs of nancial institutions
becoming insolvent.
Another way of preventing a failing institution from posing a systemic risk is simply
to prevent it from failing ex post. us, the use of bank resolution regimes may be a partial
substitute for forms of direct and indirect public assistance such as capital injections, spe-
cial liquidity facilities, asset purchase schemes and liability guarantees. is implies that
ecient bank resolution regimes can serve to reduce governments’ ex post incentives to
engage in bailouts. Governments might wish to commit to a no-bailout policy in order to
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discourage nancial institutions from taking excessive risks, but they may nd themselves
unable to relinquish their discretion. A government unable to tie its hands with respect to
future bailouts might therefore choose to improve its bank resolution regime in order to
solve its time inconsistency problem.
Such improvements come at a cost, however. e process of establishing or reforming
a bank resolution regime requires the passage of legislation, which may delay other items
on the government’s legislative agenda or expend its political capital. Although bank res-
olution regimes may reduce the workload of normal bankruptcy courts, they may place
additional burdens on rms and the authorities responsible for implementing them. Such
regimes may call for additional monitoring of nancial institutions by regulators to ensure
that they are resolvable, and for more extensive cooperation between dierent government
agencies, both within and across national borders.
is paper presents a simple model that demonstrates the potential role of bank res-
olution regimes in reducing moral hazard in the nancial sector. Bank resolution reform
is modelled as a costly investment that raises the fraction of the value of a bank’s assets
that can be recovered in resolution. If this fraction is high enough, the government’s time
inconsistency problem disappears, meaning it in fact prefers to resolve insolvent banks
instead of bailing them out. is in turn will deter banks from taking socially inecient
risks. Bank resolution reform thus serves as a costly commitment device against bailouts.
Indeed, in the model presented below, this is its only role. A government with full and
costless commitment would simply announce that it will never bail banks out. is would
induce banks to invest prudently, and in fact (given the structure of asset returns in the
model) no bank would ever need to be bailed out or resolved.
When the model is extended to introduce strategic interactions among banks, banks
may wish to coordinate their investment strategies. During a nancial crisis, in which
many banks become insolvent at the same time, the government may be more reluctant
to resolve banks than in normal times. However, a suciently robust resolution regime
can still commit the government to choosing resolution over bailouts, thus eliminating
equilibria in which banks coordinate on risky investment strategies.
e greater a government’s scal capacity relative to the size of its banking sector,
the more bailouts it can aord. is means well-resourced governments will nd it more
dicult to convince banks that they will not receive bailouts in the event of insolvency.
ese governments will require particularly ecient bank resolution regimes if they are
to credibly commit themselves to avoiding bailouts. A further implication is that eorts
to shrink the banking sector may result in a loss of anti-bailout credibility, and that such
eorts are best combined with bank resolution reform to restore this credibility.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.1.1 surveys some of the related
literature on moral hazard in the nancial sector and the time consistency of government
nancial policy; Section 1.1.2 discusses the bank resolution regimes currently in place in
the UK and the US; Section 2.2 presents a simple model of optimal government investment
in bank resolution regimes; Section 1.3 shows that the key results of this simple model are
preserved when the model is extended in various directions; and Section 2.6 concludes.
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1.1.1 Related Literature
Hellmann et al. (2000) consider a model with deposit insurance in which banks face a
portfolio decision between a “prudent” asset and a “gambling” asset. Competition between
banks erodes their franchise values, thus encouraging socially inecient gambling. Capital
requirements force banks to internalize the adverse eects of gambling, and so suciently
strict capital requirements can induce them to invest prudently. However, forcing banks
to hold more capital is costly and reduces their franchise values (which, ceteris paribus, in-
creases their incentives to gamble). is means gambling can be prevented more eciently
by a combination of capital requirements and deposit rate ceilings, which limit interbank
competition and thereby preserve bank franchise values. Cooper and Ross (2002) study
a similar environment in which Diamond and Dybvig (1983)-style runs are also possible.
Since there are no special costs associated with holding bank capital in their model, they
demonstrate that the rst-best allocation can be achieved by a combination of full deposit
insurance (to prevent runs) and capital requirements (to prevent gambling).
Optimal contracts can require ex post ineciency in some states of the world, and
therefore be time inconsistent. For example, a credible threat of bankruptcy might miti-
gate moral hazard problems, but if bankruptcy is costly then renegotiation will be optimal
ex post. Chari and Kehoe (2013) argue that governments face stronger incentives than pri-
vate agents to avoid bankruptcies ex post because they take re sale eects into account.
As a result, the time inconsistency problem is more severe for governments than for private
agents. ey study a dynamic contracting model incorporating reputation eects, and nd
that introducing a bailout authority without commitment reduces welfare in equilibrium.
By reducing the government’s incentive to intervene ex post, ex ante regulation limiting
the size and leverage of rms can be welfare improving.
Farhi and Tirole (2012) show that when bailouts are non-targeted and involve xed
costs there are strategic complementarities in banks’ liquidity-hoarding and risk-taking
decisions. When other banks hold fewer liquid (more toxic) assets, the expected size of
the bailout increases and so any particular bank will want to become less liquid (more
risky), too. In addition, because the incentives for a bailout are increasing in the number
of banks that fail, banks will prefer to fail together than to fail alone and so will choose to
correlate their assets. e authors nd that, by imposing ex ante liquidity requirements
(or, equivalently, leverage limits) on banks, a regulator can eliminate the central bank’s
temptation to pursue a low interest rate policy ex post. (In this model, the bailout takes
the form of a subsidized interest rate.)
Grochulski (2011) presents a framework in which debt default by a large nancial rm
is assumed to have spillover eects on the wider economy, creating incentives for the gov-
ernment to provide bailouts ex post. Even though equity is wiped out whenever the rm
defaults on its debt, government bailouts still provide an implicit subsidy to the rm’s
shareholders. is is because the prospect of a bailout removes creditors’ incentives to
monitor the rm’s investment decisions, thus allowing it to choose a riskier project that
yields higher expected returns for shareholders. e paper considers a number of possible
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means of addressing the government’s time inconsistency problem, including improve-
ments in resolution policy, taxes on extraordinary prots, and various forms of ex ante
regulation. Whereas in the model of Grochulski (2011) the social costs of nancial fail-
ure take a general form, in the present paper they will be modelled explicitly in terms of
inecient liquidation of banks’ assets.
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) posit that outsiders cannot realize the full value of
banking assets, and that banks are therefore the most ecient users of banking assets
(provided they can be incentivized to avoid the bad projects that yield them private, non-
pecuniary benets). is means that there will be a loss of allocative eciency whenever
the banking sector as a whole lacks sucient liquidity to purchase the assets of failed
banks. is in turn creates an incentive for the authorities to bail out failed banks or pro-
vide liquidity to surviving banks. Whereas the former policy provides incentives for banks
to herd (since intervention is more likely when many banks are failing at once), the lat-
ter policy encourages banks to diversify (since surviving banks can benet by purchasing
assets at “re sale” or “cash-in-the-market” prices). e authors demonstrate that ex ante
welfare is higher when banks diversify, and that a policy of providing liquidity to surviving
banks is time consistent.
e model presented below will dier by assuming asset specicity at the individual
bank level: only the bank that originated an asset can realize its full value, and so liquida-
tion of bank assets is always costly. is means providing liquidity to surviving banks will
not be an eective substitute for bailouts here. Although the present paper will not model
cash-in-the-market pricing explicitly, Section 1.3.2 will allow the ex post costs of resolu-
tion to depend upon the volume of bank assets being resolved at once, thus mirroring the
type of re sale concerns present in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008).
DeYoung et al. (2013) model a repeated game between a utility-maximizing resolution
authority and a prot-maximizing banking sector. Unlike in most of the literature (includ-
ing the present contribution), the riskiness of banks’ portfolios is taken as given. Instead,
banks choose the complexity of their portfolios, and this determines whether or not the
resolution authority is able to resolve them. An improvement in the resolution technol-
ogy raises the complexity threshold below which failed banks can be resolved, whereas in
the present paper, improvements in the resolution technology increase the fraction of the
value of a bank’s assets that are recovered in resolution.
Unlike many of the papers just discussed, the model presented below will abstract away
from ex ante regulation. Farhi and Tirole (2012) argue that if regulation is costly it should
be conned to those institutions the authorities are most tempted to bail out ex post. ey
suggest that this corresponds to large retail banks and “other large nancial institutions
that are deeply interconnected with them through opaque transactions”. However, the
very opacity of these connections is likely to make identifying systemically important
institutions ex ante very dicult. Chari and Kehoe (2013) focus on regulations that reduce
rms’ abilities to become too big or too leveraged to fail. However, nancial innovation and
the growth of the shadow banking system may undermine the eectiveness of regulatory
capital requirements.
4
Regulations that aim to prevent nancial institutions from becoming too systemically
important to fail do nothing to reduce the government’s bailout incentives in the event
that they are circumvented. As a result, rms will face strong temptations of their own to
evade the regulatory requirements. is line of argument implies the desirability of mech-
anisms that reduce ex post incentives for bailouts. Such mechanisms would complement
regulatory restrictions on rms: if the authorities are more sanguine about the prospect
of resolving banks, then the expectation of bailouts will be reduced and the incentive to
evade regulations will be smaller.
1.1.2 Examples of Bank Resolution Regimes
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Banking Act 2009 permanently established a Special Resolution
Regime (SRR), which provides the Bank of England (in consultation with the other UK
authorities) with a number of tools for dealing with failing banks.1 e special resolution
objectives, which “are to be balanced as appropriate in each case”, are as follows: to protect
and enhance the stability of the nancial systems of the United Kingdom (in particular the
continuity of banking services); to protect and enhance public condence in the stability
of the banking systems of the United Kingdom; to protect depositors; to protect public
funds; and to avoid interfering with property rights in contravention of a Convention
right (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998).2
e SRR provides three “stabilisation tools”: sale of all or part of a rm’s business
to a private sector buyer, transfer of the same to a bridge bank, and bail-in.3 In excep-
tional circumstances, the failing rm can also be taken into temporary public ownership
by HM Treasury. e bank insolvency procedure can be used instead of or alongside these
tools. In the case of partial sale or transfer, the bank administration procedure is invoked
to ensure continuity of essential services from the residual bank. e prudential regu-
lator (either the Prudential Regulation Authority or the Financial Conduct Authority) is
responsible for determining whether a rm meets the criteria for being put into the SRR.
e Bank of England is then responsible for deciding which of the tools to use and for
carrying out the resolution transaction, except in the case of temporary public ownership.
Since the Act’s passage in February 2009, two institutions have been resolved under
the SRR. In March 2009, the core parts of Dunfermline building society were transferred
to Nationwide building society. Dunfermline’s social housing loans and related deposits
were held temporarily in a bridge bank, and then sold to Nationwide in July of that year. In
June 2011, Southsea Mortgage and Investment Company Limited was placed into the bank
insolvency procedure. e Financial Services Compensation Scheme covered deposits up
to the insured limit (then £85,000 per depositor), and all other creditors’ claims were to be
1e Financial Services Act 2012 expanded the scope of the UK resolution regime to bank holding com-
panies, central counterparties and certain investment rms and their group companies.
2Banking Act 2009, Part 1, Section 4.
3In a bail-in, creditors’ claims are wrien down in order to absorb the rm’s losses and recapitalize it.
is power was added as part of the UK’s implementation of the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.
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handled by the bank liquidator. e Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008, the emergency
precursor to the Banking Act 2009, was used to authorize: the nationalization of Northern
Rock in February 2008, the nationalization of Bradford & Bingley’s mortgage assets and
the sale of its savings deposits and branch network to Abbey in September 2008, and the
transfer to ING Direct of Heritable Bank and Kaupthing Edge in October of the same year.
United States
Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 is titled Orderly Liquidation Authority, and its stated
purpose is “to provide the necessary authority to liquidate failing nancial companies that
pose a signicant risk to the nancial stability of the United States in a manner that miti-
gates such risk and minimizes moral hazard.”4 A failing nancial company can be put into
receivership under the provisions of the Act if the relevant regulatory authorities and the
Secretary of the Treasury deem that it would pose a systemic risk to the nancial system.
Once the authorities determine that a company poses a systemic risk, the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is appointed as receiver (except in the case of insurance
companies, which are dealt with under state law). e directors and ocers of the com-
pany have a right to contest the decision, but unless the US District Court for the District
of Columbia determines within 24 hours that the Secretary’s determination was “arbitrary
and capricious”, the appointment of the FDIC as receiver will go through.
Once it assumes control over a company, the FDIC may act without consulting or giv-
ing notice to the company’s creditors, counterparties or shareholders. e powers granted
to the FDIC as receiver are similar to those granted to the UK authorities under the SRR. It
may sell o the company’s assets, or arrange for the company as a whole to be acquired by
private buyers. It can also create a bridge company to hold some of the company’s assets
and liabilities while a buyer is being found. e FDIC has the power to review claims on
the company, and may deviate from the principle of equal treatment for similarly situated
claimants in order to maximize the value of the company’s assets (as long as all claimants
receive at least as much as they would have under the usual bankruptcy procedures).5
1.2 A Model of Financial Intermediation with Moral Hazard
Consider an innite-horizon economy populated by a unit measure of risk-neutral in-
vestors, some of whom are also bankers, and a government that may resolve failed banks
or bail them out. Each investor is endowed with a single unit of the consumption good
at the start of every period. A subset of investors are also endowed with banking li-
cences, which permit them to oer non-state-contingent debt contracts to other investors.
Banker i promises to pay a gross interest rate ri at the end of the period for each unit of
the consumption good he raises at the start. Investors can choose either to accept such a
debt contract or to store their consumption endowment until the end of the period, and
4Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1454 (2010),
Section 204(a).
5See ibid., Sections 210(b)(4)(A), 210(d)(2), 210(d)(3) and 210(h)(5)(E).
6
they will choose whichever option yields them the highest expected return. If multiple
banks oer the same interest rate, customers are divided evenly between them. ere is
no inter-period storage technology, so all goods are consumed at the end of each period.
As in Hellmann et al. (2000), bankers can invest their customers’ funds in two assets: a
risky (“gambling”) asset and a safe (“prudent”) asset.6 e risky asset pays a gross return
of RH at the end of the period with probability θ , and RL with probability 1 − θ . e safe
asset yields a gross return of S > 1 with certainty. e risky asset has a higher return than
the safe asset in the good state of the world, but a lower expected return than storage,
that is, θRH + (1 − θ )RL < 1 < S < RH . Since all agents in this economy are risk-
neutral, this means that bank-intermediated investment is potentially welfare-enhancing,
but gambling is inecient. Nevertheless, the prospect of bailouts may induce investors to
supply funding to banks they know will gamble.
At the end of each period, a bank may or may not be able to repay its investors the full
amount it promised them. If the realized return from its investments exceeds the promised
interest rate ri , then the bank pays its investors in full and the banker keeps and consumes
any prots. If the bank’s investments yield less than ri then the bank is insolvent. In
equilibrium, insolvent banks will be those that choose the risky asset and get the low
return RL . Let σ denote the fraction of gambling bankers whose gamble succeeds and
yields the high returnRH . For now, we assume that bankers’ asset returns are independent,
so σ = θ , but in Section 1.3.1 below we will also consider the case of perfect correlation.
When banks become insolvent, the government can either bail them out or put them
through resolution. In a bailout, the government makes up the dierence between the
amount owed to investors and the value of the bank’s assets, investors are paid in full, and
the bank is allowed to continue trading. When the government opts to resolve a bank, the
bank resolution authority strips the banker of his licence, liquidates the bank’s assets, and
distributes the proceeds proportionally to investors.7
ere is asset specicity at the individual bank level: only if a banker is allowed to
continue running his bank can he engage in the monitoring necessary to realize the full
value of its assets. In a bailout, this full “going concern” value of the bank’s assets is
preserved. In contrast, when the bank resolution authority liquidates an insolvent bank’s
assets, it can only recover a fraction λ(h) < 1 of their full value.
e government’s objective function depends on the total welfare of the agents in the
economy. Since all agents are risk-neutral and there is only one consumption good, this is
equivalent to the total value of the economy’s resources. However, if it bails out a bank,
the government’s objective function is reduced by an amount η < RL , which represents
the costs of bailouts that go beyond the moral hazard problem they create. ese costs
include: the need in practice to use distortionary taxation to pay for bailouts; the fact that
bailouts could involve redistribution from poor to rich, as in Cooper and Kempf (2013); and
6Bankers cannot invest their own endowments in these assets directly, but like all other investors they
may entrust their personal funds to another bank or use intra-period storage. is corresponds to the so-called
Volcker Rule (Section 619 of the Dodd–Frank Act), which prohibits banks from proprietary trading.
7Bank resolution authorities’ transfer, bridge bank and bail-in powers are not modelled explicitly here.
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the prospect of angry taxpayers punishing governments for bailouts at the ballot box. e
distortionary eects of the taxation needed to pay for bailouts will be modelled explicitly
in Section 1.3.4, but for now the reduced-form parameter η allows us to focus on the moral
hazard and time consistency aspects of our model. Initially we will assume that η is a
per-bank cost, but Section 1.3.1 will consider the implications of a xed bailout cost that
is paid whenever the government bails out a strictly positive fraction of banks.
We abstract away from all forms of ex ante regulation of banks. In particular, the gov-
ernment cannot impose capital requirements or deposit-rate ceilings. e only sanction
for a gambling banker is that he may lose his licence. Conscated banking licences are
randomly reassigned at the beginning of the next period. Since there is a continuum of
agents in the economy, the probability of a banker having a particular licence returned to
him is zero. However, all agents have the same probability of receiving a licence, including
those who already have a licence and those who have recently lost one. is means some
bankers may end up with multiple licences, but since market share is split evenly across
banks oering the same interest rate, each additional licence is potentially valuable.
We model bank resolution reform as a costly investment by the government that im-
proves the recovery fraction λ(h). e government’s investment h in its bank resolution
authority is made at the very beginning of each period, and depreciates fully between peri-
ods. e UK special resolution objective of protecting taxpayers, and the FDIC’s discretion
under the Dodd–Frank Act to prioritize asset value over equal treatment, demonstrate that
recovering a high fraction of the value of a bank’s assets is indeed a key objective of reso-
lution. Another important priority for bank resolution authorities is the mitigation of re
sale eects, which will be introduced in Section 1.3.2 below.
We will solve the model backwards, starting from the government’s choice between
bailouts and resolution, and then compare the model’s equilibrium outcome to that of a
model in which the government can costlessly pre-commit to a policy for insolvent banks.
1.2.1 e Government’s Choice of Bailouts vs. Resolution
We begin our analysis at the nal stage of a period, when banks’ returns have been realized
and the government must decide what to do with those that are insolvent. Due to our
assumption that funds are split evenly between banks oering the same interest rate, all
insolvent banks will be of the same size in equilibrium. is means there is no distinction
between the government’s decision about what fraction of insolvent banks to bail out and
what fraction of insolvent banks’ total liabilities to cover (we rule out partial bailouts of
individual banks).
e government’s objective function is:
V = X − h + д
(
θRH + (1 − θ )
(
b (RL − η) + (1 − b)λ(h)RL
))
+ (1 − д)S ,
where X is an exogenous source of revenue, h is the up-front investment the government
made in its bank resolution authority, д is the proportion of banks that chose to gamble,
and S is the return on the safe asset. Only a fraction θ of gambling banks will obtain the
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high return RH (recall that we are assuming independent asset returns, so σ = θ ), and in
equilibrium the remaining 1−θ of them that get the low return RL will all be insolvent. For
the fraction b of (randomly chosen) insolvent banks that the government chooses to bail
out, the full asset value is preserved, but the government suers the economic and political
cost η of bailouts. e remaining proportion 1 − b of insolvent banks are shut down by
the bank resolution authority, which can only recover a fraction λ(h) of the value of their
assets in resolution.
e part of the government’s objective function that depends on the bailout fraction b
is
д(1 − θ )b
((
1 − λ(h)
)
RL − η
)
.
is expression is linear in b, which means that the government’s optimal choice of the
bailout fraction will be as follows:
b∗ =

0 if
(
1 − λ(h)
)
RL ≤ η,
1 otherwise.
is means the government will not bail out any banks as long as the resources that would
be saved by avoiding resolution are less than or equal to the economic and political costs
of the bailout itself.
e government’s ex post no-bailout condition is therefore
λ(h) ≥ 1 − η
RL
. (1.1)
We can now see that the government’s ex post decision between bailouts and resolution
depends on its initial investment in the bank resolution authority. e ex post no-bailout
condition (1.1) will be more easily satised when the recovery fraction λ is higher, and this
is a function of the up-front investment h.8 is means the government can eectively
commit itself to a no-bailout policy by making a suciently large investment in its bank
resolution authority. is is the crucial mechanism through which bank resolution reform
can reduce moral hazard.
By observing the government’s investment in its bank resolution authority, banks and
their investors will be able to infer whether they will be bailed out or resolved in the event
of insolvency. To see how this aects their behaviour, we turn now to the portfolio choice
problem banks face once they have raised their funds.
1.2.2 Banks’ Temptation to Gamble with Investors’ Funds
Consider a bank that has promised its investors the prevailing market interest rate r , and
has thus raised a proportional share (which for convenience we normalize to one) of all
the available funds. If it always invests prudently, it will earn prots of S − r each period,
8For comparison, an increase in λ in the present framework is analogous to a reduction in M (the ratio of
social to private costs arising from losses on nancial rm debt) in the framework of Grochulski (2011).
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so its franchise value is just
∞∑
t=0
β t (S − r ) = S − r1 − β ,
where β < 1 is the per-period discount factor.
Now suppose instead that the bank gambles for T periods and returns to prudence
thereaer. In each period that it gambles, the bank will make a prot of RH − r with
probability θ . e bank will be allowed to continue operating in the next period if its
gamble is successful (with probability θ ), or if it is unsuccessful but receives a bailout (with
probability (1 − θ )b). (In equilibrium, all insolvent banks are symmetric, and insolvent
banks are chosen at random to make up the government’s chosen bailout proportion b, so
the probability of a given insolvent bank receiving a bailout is just b.) If the bank survives
all T periods of gambling, it will earn prots of S − r in each future period. Its franchise
value will therefore be:
1 −
((
θ + (1 − θ )b
)
β
)T
1 −
(
θ + (1 − θ )b
)
β
θ
(
RH − r
)
+
((
θ + (1 − θ )b
)
β
)T S − r
1 − β .
Banks will prefer not to gamble ex post if the franchise value associated with gambling
forT ≥ 1 periods is less than or equal to the franchise value of investing prudently forever:
1 −
((
θ + (1 − θ )b
)
β
)T
1 −
(
θ + (1 − θ )b
)
β
θ
(
RH − r
)
+
((
θ + (1 − θ )b
)
β
)T S − r
1 − β ≤
S − r
1 − β .
Solving for the interest rate r yields the following ex post no-gambling condition:
r ≤
(
1 −
(
θ + (1 − θ )b
)
β
)
S − (1 − β )θRH
(1 − θ ) (1 − bβ ) ≡ r
P (b), (1.2)
where rP is the maximum interest rate compatible with prudent investment, which de-
pends on the anticipated bailout fraction b. is means that a bank can commit itself to
investing prudently by announcing an interest rate less than or equal to rP . Note that T ,
the number of periods to gamble, drops out of this expression: if it is not protable to
gamble for one period, it will not be protable to gamble for more periods.9
1.2.3 Investors’ Choice Between Gambling and Prudent Banks
Since banks are competitive, they will eectively aempt to maximize investors’ utility
subject to a non-negative prot constraint. Investors’ utility is increasing in the promised
interest rate r , but this interest rate will also determine whether banks will be tempted
to gamble ex post. If the promised interest rate exceeds rP , the maximum interest rate
compatible with prudence (that is, if the ex post no-gambling condition (1.2) is violated),
9is is an application of the one-shot deviation principle (see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991,
108–110)).
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then investors will anticipate that the bank will gamble with their funds.
A bank that is content to reveal that it will gamble can promise an interest rate as high
as RH without making losses. Competition among gambling banks will drive their interest
rates up to this level.10 If a bank’s gamble succeeds, it pays out the full return RH to its
investors. If the gamble fails, the bank shuts down, and investors’ payos depend on the
bailout probability b and the recovery fraction λ. In contrast, a bank that wishes to commit
itself to prudence can oer an interest rate no higher than rP . Competition among prudent
banks will drive the interest rate up to this level but no higher, so they will earn a prot
of S − rP each period.
In a competitive equilibrium, banks will oer whichever interest rate maximizes in-
vestors’ expected utility. e expected return from investing one unit with a prudent bank
is just the gross interest rate rP , since there is no possibility of failure when a bank invests
prudently. e expected return from a bank that promises the interest rateRH (and thereby
reveals that it will gamble) is
(
θ + (1−θ )b
)
RH + (1−θ ) (1−b)λ(h)RL . If investors’ expected
returns from a prudent bank weakly exceed those from a gambling bank, then all banks
will oer the prudent interest rate, rP . We will have a prudent equilibrium whenever the
following ex ante no-gambling condition is satised:
(
θ + (1 − θ )b
)
RH + (1 − θ ) (1 − b)λ(h)RL ≤
(
1 −
(
θ + (1 − θ )b
)
β
)
S − (1 − β )θRH
(1 − θ ) (1 − bβ ) . (1.3)
In a prudent equilibrium, competition between banks does not drive interest rates
above rP , since any bank oering a higher rate will gamble and thus yield investors a lower
expected return. is means that bankers earn positive prots in a prudent equilibrium.
However, the existence of these prots does not mean that the equilibrium is inecient:
indeed, it is these prots that induce bankers to choose the asset with the highest expected
return for society.
Holding the bailout probabilityb constant, an increase in the recovery fraction λ makes
gambling banks more aractive to investors, since it increases their payo in the event that
their bank is allowed to fail. (However, as condition (1.1) shows, the bailout probability b
depends negatively upon the recovery fraction λ.)
An increase in the bailout probability b has two eects, both of which make gambling
banks more aractive to investors. First, it means investors are more likely to be made
whole in the event that their gambling bank gets into trouble. Second, it reduces the
maximum interest rate that prudent banks can oer. Since a higher bailout probability
reduces the risk of a bank losing its franchise, the franchise value of prudent banks must
rise in order to deter them from gambling. is in turn requires higher prots each period,
which means paying a lower interest rate to investors.
Let bP be the cuto value of the bailout probability, at or below which investors prefer
10If all banks are oering r < RH , it will be a protable deviation for a given bank to increase its interest
rate. However, once all banks are oering r = RH , this is no longer the case. us, even though investors
might benet from higher interest rates (since they would receive transfers from the government in the event
of a bailout), we stipulate that banks will oer at most r = RH .
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prudent banks, and above which investors prefer gambling banks. Investors will always
prefer gambling banks if they are guaranteed to be bailed out. Under certain parameter
restrictions, investors will prefer prudence whenever insolvent banks are guaranteed to
be resolved. e following Proposition establishes this formally:
Proposition 1. If
θ ≤ S − 1
(1 − β )RH + βS − 1 ∈ (0,1), (1.4)
then ∃!bP ∈ [0,1).
Proof. Dierentiating both sides of (1.3) with respect to the bailout probability b yields
(1−θ )
(
RH −λ(h)RL
)
> 0 and−(1−β )βθ (RH −S )/
(
(1 − θ ) (1 − bβ )2
)
< 0 respectively, con-
rming that gambling banks become relatively more aractive to investors as the bailout
probability increases. is tells us that the cuto bailout probability bP will be unique.
If b = 0, that is, if the government is expected to resolve all insolvent banks, then the
ex ante no-gambling condition (1.3) becomes:
θRH + (1 − θ )λ(h)RL ≤ (1 − βθ )S − (1 − β )θRH1 − θ .
Since λ(h) < 1 for all h, our assumption that the expected return on the risky asset is
less than that on storage ensures that the le-hand side of this condition is less than one,
and assumption (1.4) ensures that the right-hand side is greater than or equal to one. is
means that prudence is preferred when b = 0, so we must have bP ≥ 0. (Assumption (1.4)
also ensures that prudent banking pays investors a return greater than or equal to that of
storage when b = 0, thus satisfying investors’ participation constraints.)
On the other hand, if b = 1, that is, if all banks will be bailed out in the event of
insolvency, then condition (1.3) becomes RH ≤ S . Since the risky asset’s high return is
greater than that of the safe asset, this condition is always violated. is tells us thatbP < 1.

1.2.4 Optimal Investment in the Bank Resolution Authority
We saw in Section 1.2.1 above that, in this basic version of the model, the government will
choose either to resolve all insolvent banks or to bail them all out. Proposition 1 tells us that
there will be a prudent equilibrium if the government is expected to resolve all insolvent
banks. From condition (1.1), we can see that the government will nd it optimal to do so
ex post as long as the recovery fraction λ is suciently high, which in turn depends on
the up-front investment h in the bank resolution authority.
e minimum value of the recovery fraction that satises condition (1.1) is λ(h) =
1 − η/RL . Here it will be more convenient to think of the government as choosing λ di-
rectly, and making whatever investment h(λ) is necessary to achieve this. We can think
of h (1 − η/RL ) as the cost the government must pay to establish its commitment to a
no-bailout policy. Since paying this cost will ensure that banks invest prudently, and by
assumption the prudent asset never fails, there is no benet to investing more than this
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amount in the bank resolution authority. Making any lesser investment will guarantee
bailouts ex post, and thus ensure that the authority is never used. erefore, if the gov-
ernment decides not to invest enough to establish its commitment, then there is no reason
for it to invest anything at all.
If the government decides to pay the commitment cost, the expected value of its ob-
jective function will be
E(V ) = X − h
(
1 − η
RL
)
+ S .
If instead it decides to invest zero, the expected value will be
E(V ) = X + θRH + (1 − θ ) (RL − η).
Comparing these two values tells us that as long as
h
(
1 − η
RL
)
≤ S −
(
θRH + (1 − θ ) (RL − η)
)
, (1.5)
the government will choose to pay the commitment cost and thus ensure that banks invest
prudently in equilibrium.
Since the prudent asset has a guaranteed payo, the only role of the strengthened bank
resolution authority is to convince investors that insolvent banks will be resolved instead
of bailed out. As with deposit insurance in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, the
bank resolution authority is benecial despite not being used in equilibrium. However, in
contrast with Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the government policy required to implement
the preferred equilibrium is costly. Indeed, if condition (1.5) were not satised, the cost of
commitment would be too high, and so the government would prefer to make no invest-
ment in its bank resolution authority, let banks gamble, and bail them out in the event of
insolvency.
1.2.5 Comparison with the Case of Costless Pre-Commitment
To emphasize that the role of the bank resolution authority here is to establish the govern-
ment’s commitment to choosing resolution over bailouts, we now compare the outcome
of our basic model to that of a variant in which the government can costlessly pre-commit
to a policy for insolvent banks.
Suppose now that at the beginning of each period, the government simultaneously
chooses its investment h in the bank resolution authority, and pre-commits to bail out a
fraction b of insolvent banks (and to resolve the rest). From Proposition 1, we know that
if the government commits to b ≤ bP , then in equilibrium all banks will invest prudently
and the expected value of the government’s objective function will be
E(V ) = X − h (λ) + S .
Since by assumption prudent banks never become insolvent, the bank resolution authority
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will never be used, and so the recovery fraction is absent from the government’s objective
function. is means the government’s optimal policy is to announce b ≤ bP and to invest
nothing in bank resolution reform.
If we were to make the return on the prudent asset stochastic, then a government with
costless commitment might also wish to invest a positive amount in its bank resolution
authority. Nevertheless, there would still exist regions of the parameter space in which it
would optimally invest less than a government with discretion.
1.3 Robustness
Having shown in a simple model that governments can commit themselves to choosing
resolution over bailouts by improving their bank resolution regimes, we now examine the
robustness of this result to various extensions that relax the model’s assumptions.
1.3.1 Strategic Interactions Among Banks
We assumed in the discussion above that the economic and political cost of bailouts, η, was
a per-bank cost. Since the recovery fraction λ is the same for all banks, and invariant to
the measure of banks being resolved, this leaves no room for strategic interactions among
banks.
Suppose now that the cost η is paid whenever the government engages in bailouts,
regardless of how many banks are bailed out or what fraction of total industry liabilities
those banks represent.11
Let 1b>0 be an indicator variable that takes the value one if the government engages in
bailouts and zero otherwise. en the ex post value of the government’s objective function
when it bails out a fraction b of insolvent banks will be
V = X − h + д
(
σRH + (1 − σ )
(
bRL + (1 − b)λ(h)RL
))
+ (1 − д)S − 1b>0η,
where σ is the fraction of gambling banks whose assets yield the high return RH and are
therefore solvent (which above was always equal to θ since we assumed independent asset
returns). e part of this expression that depends on the bailout fraction b is
д(1 − σ )b
(
1 − λ(h)
)
RL − 1b>0η.
Inspecting this expression, we can see that the relevant choice for the government
is either to bail out all д(1 − σ ) insolvent banks, or to abstain from bailouts completely.
Since the cost η does not increase as further banks are bailed out, the government has no
reason to limit the scope of bailouts once it has paid the cost (since bailouts avoid the loss
of resources associated with liquidation). e government therefore compares the xed
11is undermines the interpretation ofη as the cost of distortionary taxation or undesirable redistribution,
and instead encourages its interpretation as a political cost associated with a loss of reputation. In this sense
it is akin to the xed cost of abandoning a currency peg in “second generation” models of speculative aack
such as Obstfeld (1996).
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cost η of bailouts to the resources д(1 − σ )
(
1 − λ(h)
)
RL that would be saved by bailing
out all insolvent banks rather than resolving them, and its ex post no-bailout condition
becomes:
λ(h) ≥ 1 − η
д(1 − σ )RL . (1.6)
We now consider how knowledge of this ex post condition will aect the behaviour
of banks and investors. Banks’ ex post and ex ante no-gambling conditions will be un-
changed from (1.2) and (1.3) above. However, unlike condition (1.1) above, whether or not
condition (1.6) is satised may depend on the proportion д of banks that choose to gamble,
and the fraction 1 − σ of those that become insolvent. For a given value of the recovery
fraction λ, the more banks that gamble ex ante (and the more of them that become insol-
vent), the more tempting it is for the government to bail insolvent banks out ex post. is
means that whether or not a given bank anticipates a bailout depends on how many other
banks it expects to gamble. is introduces the prospect of strategic interactions among
banks (what Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) refer to as the “too many to fail” problem)
and of multiple equilibria.
As above, we assume that (1.4) is satised, so investors will prefer prudent banks to
gambling ones if they anticipate that insolvent banks will be resolved rather than bailed
out. Rearranging the government’s new ex post no-bailout condition (1.6), we can see that
this expectation will be justied as long as
д ≤ η
(1 − σ )
(
1 − λ(h)
)
RL
≡ дP (h,σ ) > 0, (1.7)
whereas if this condition is violated, investors will anticipate that the government will
provide universal bailouts.
We introduce the binary variable дi to denote a given bank’s portfolio decision, with
one representing gambling and zero representing prudent investment. en from condi-
tion (1.7) and Proposition 1, we can see that the bank’s reaction function will be
дi =
 0 if E(д) ≤ д
P (h,σ ),
1 otherwise.
(1.8)
In equilibrium, expectations about д will be correct, and so we will have д = E(д). Since
banks are symmetric, in equilibrium we will also have д = дi . Either all banks will invest
prudently (д = 0) or all banks will gamble (д = 1), depending on which strategy yields the
highest expected payo for investors.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the costη of bailouts does not depend on the proportionд(1−σ )b
of banks the government bails out, and let condition (1.4) be satised. en an equilibrium
in which all banks invest prudently (д = 0) always exists, regardless of the government’s
investment h in the bank resolution authority.
Proof. Observe from condition (1.7) that дP (h,σ ) > 0 for all h ≥ 0 and for all σ ∈ [0,1].
Suppose that all agents expect that no banks will gamble in equilibrium, that is, E(д) = 0.
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Figure 1.1: Bank’s Best Response to the Proportion of Competitors it Expects to Gamble.
en from the reaction function (1.8), we can see that banks will optimally invest prudently
(since this is what investors prefer), and this validates the expectation that no banks will
gamble (д = 0). 
Proposition 3. Suppose that limh→∞ λ(h) = 1, and let condition (1.4) be satised. en
a suciently large investment h ≥ hP in the bank resolution authority can eliminate the
equilibrium in which all banks gamble (д = 1).
Proof. Consider the ex ante no-bailout condition (1.7). Since η < RL , limh→∞ λ(h) = 1 im-
plies limh→∞ дP (h,σ ) = ∞ for all σ ∈ [0,1]. e recovery fraction λ(h) is monotonically
increasing in the investment h in the bank resolution authority, so if limh→∞ дP (h,σ ) = ∞,
then for all σ ∈ [0,1] there must exist some hP (σ ) such that дP
(
hP (σ ),σ
)
≥ 1. When
дP (h,σ ) ≥ 1, agents will anticipate from condition (1.6) that the government will resolve
all insolvent banks, regardless of the proportion д(1 − σ ) that are insolvent. Since condi-
tion (1.4) is satised, we know from Proposition 1 that when the government is expected
to resolve all insolvent banks, investors will prefer prudent banks to gambling ones. 
Propositions 2 and 3 are illustrated in Figure 1.1, which plots an individual bank’s op-
timal strategy дi as a function of the proportion д of its competitors it expects to gamble,
for a given correlation of asset returns. As the investment h in the bank resolution au-
thority (and hence the recovery fraction λ) increases, the threshold value дP above which
gambling is optimal also increases, shiing the doed vertical line to the right. When h
(and thus λ) is high enough such that дP ≥ 1, the gambling equilibrium no longer exists,
since no maer how many other banks are expected to gamble, any individual bank will
be more aractive to investors if it invests prudently.
In order to eliminate the gambling equilibrium, the government would have to make
an investment in the bank resolution authority sucient to raise the recovery fraction
to λ ≥ 1 − η/
(
(1 − σ )RL
)
for all possible values of σ . In the independent returns case,
we always have σ = θ , whereas if returns were perfectly correlated, σ would be equal
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to either zero or one. Since the bailout fraction b only maers for a given bank when its
asset yields the low return RL , the relevant case is the one in which σ = 0. Looking at
condition (1.6), we see that the right-hand side is decreasing in σ . is implies that it is
more costly for the government to commit to a no-bailout policy (and hence induce banks
to invest prudently) when banks’ asset returns are more highly correlated.
1.3.2 Fire Sale Eects
Fire sale eects are another potential source of policy-induced strategic interactions among
banks. If the recovery fraction λ is a function not only of the government’s investment h
in the bank resolution authority, but also the proportion ρ ≡ д(1 − σ ) (1 − b) of banks
that are resolved in a given period, then the government’s optimal bailout policy ex post
may depend on the number of insolvent banks, as in the version of the model with a xed
bailout cost η in Section 1.3.1 above.
Let η be a per-bank cost as in Section 2.2, and specify
λ = λ (h,ρ) ,
with ρ ≡ д(1 − σ ) (1 − b) and λρ (h,ρ) < 0.12 en for a given investment h in the bank
resolution authority and a given proportion ν ≡ д(1 − σ ) of insolvent banks, the govern-
ment will choose the bailout fraction b ex post to maximize the value of insolvent banks’
assets, net of the bailout costs:
b∗ (h,ν ) = arg max
b
b (RL − η) + (1 − b)λ(h,ρ)RL s.t. b ∈ [0,1]. (1.9)
In Section 1.3.1 above, the government faced a xed cost of bailouts, and so found it
optimal either to bail all insolvent banks out or to resolve them all. With re sale eects
and per-bank bailout costs, the government trades o the marginal cost of an additional
bailout with the marginal benets in terms of assets not liquidated and a higher recovery
fraction λ. is means it may choose to bail out an interior fraction of insolvent banks.
Assuming an interior solution for the optimal bailout fraction b∗, by totally dierenti-
ating the rst-order condition associated with (1.9) and rearranging, we can show that b∗
will depend on the fraction ν ≡ д(1 − σ ) of banks that become insolvent as follows:
b∗ν (h,ν ) =
1 − b∗ (h,ν )
ν
≥ 0.
Using this expression, it is straightforward to calculate that the optimal bailout frac-
tion b∗ will depend on the proportion д of banks that choose to gamble, and the fraction σ
of those whose assets yield the high return RH (and hence are solvent) as follows:
∂b∗ (h,ν )
∂д
=
1 − b∗ (h,ν )
д
≥ 0,
12We use λρ (h,ρ) to denote the partial derivative of the function λ(h,ρ) with respect to the argument ρ.
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and
∂b∗ (h,ν )
∂σ
= −1 − b
∗ (h,ν )
1 − σ ≤ 0.
is tells us that, as above, there will be strategic complementarities in banks’ decisions
about whether or not to gamble, and that greater correlation of banks’ asset returns will
make gambling more aractive.
With a xed bailout cost, the size of the government’s ex ante investmenth could aect
whether or not its no-bailout condition would hold ex post. With re sale eects and per-
bank bailout costs, the government can still constrain its ex post behaviour by investing
in its bank resolution authority.
Proposition 4. Assume λρ2 (h,ρ) ≤ 0 (marginal re sale eects are not ameliorated as more
assets are liquidated) and λρ,h (h,ρ) ≥ 0 (investment in the bank resolution authority does
not exacerbate re sale eects). en the government’s optimal ex post bailout fraction b∗ is
decreasing in its up-front investment h in the bank resolution authority.
Proof. e rst-order condition associated with (1.9) is
(
1 − λ(h,ρ) − ρλρ (h,ρ)
)
RL−η = 0.
Totally dierentiating this with respect to h and rearranging shows us that the govern-
ment’s optimal bailout fraction b∗ depends on h as follows:
b∗h (h,ρ) =
λh (h,ρ) + ρλρ,h (h,ρ)
ν
(
2λρ (h,ρ) + ρλρ2 (h,ρ)
) .
Since λh (h,ρ) > 0, λρ (h,ρ) < 0, ρ ≥ 0 andν ≥ 0, our assumptions on λρ2 (h,ρ) and λρ,h (h,ρ)
are sucient to ensure that the sign of this expression is unambiguously negative. 
LetRi denote the return on bank i’s investment portfolio. In order to prevent gambling,
the government must ensure that the following inequality holds:
(
θ + (1 − θ )bˆ
)
RH + (1 − θ ) (1 − bˆ)λˆ(h,ρ)RL ≤
(
1 − β
(
θ + (1 − θ )bˆ
))
S − (1 − β )θRH
(1 − θ ) (1 − βbˆ) ,
(1.10)
where bˆ ≡ E (b | Ri = RL ) and λˆ(h,ρ) ≡ E (λ(h,ρ) | Ri = RL ). e above expression states
that the expected return from investing with a bank that promises RH and gambles must
not exceed that from investing with a bank that promises the highest interest rate com-
patible with prudence.
In order to completely eliminate gambling equilibria, condition (1.10) must be satised
even in the government’s worst-case scenario, which is when all banks choose to gamble
(д = 1) and perfectly correlate their asset returns (σ = 0 when Ri = RL ). In the worst-case
scenario, we will have
ρ = 1 − b . (1.11)
erefore, if the government wishes to prevent gambling, its optimal investment h∗ in its
bank resolution authority will be the minimum necessary to ensure that condition (1.10)
holds subject to equations (1.9) and (1.11). is will be desirable for the government when-
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ever
S − h∗ ≥ θRH + (1 − θ ) (RL − η).
e requirement that the bank resolution authority be eective enough to handle even
the most severe nancial crises without the government being tempted to resort to bailouts
is a demanding one indeed. However, as we shall see in the following section, limits to the
government’s resources can ameliorate its time inconsistency problem in precisely these
scenarios, taking the burden of establishing a credible no-bailout commitment o the bank
resolution authority.
1.3.3 Limited Government Resources
us far we have assumed that the government is deep-pocketed, that is, that its exoge-
nous pool of resources X (raised through taxation or the sale of state-owned resources) is
suciently large that it can aord to bail out the entire banking system. e purpose of
this section is to relax this assumption and draw out the implications for banks’ behaviour
and optimal government policy.
With a continuum of symmetric banks, we can dene the maximum fraction of banks
the government can aord to bail out, b¯, as follows:
b¯ ≡ min
{
X − h
д(1 − σ ) (r − RL ) ,1
}
.
Ex post, the government will bail out a fraction b (h,ν ) = min{b∗ (h,ν ),b¯ (h,ν )} of insol-
vent banks, where b∗ (h,ν ) is the optimal bailout fraction dened in (1.9) above. We have
seen already that
b∗ν (h,ν ) =
1 − b∗ (h,ν )
ν
≥ 0.
Dierentiating with respect to ν yields:
b∗ν 2 (h,ν ) = −
2 (1 − b∗ (h,ν ))
ν2
≤ 0,
which tells us that b∗ (h,ν ) is increasing and concave.
Focusing on the region in which b¯ < 1, we can see immediately the intuitive result that
the more banks are insolvent, the lower the fraction of them the government can aord to
bail out:
b¯ν = − X − h
ν2 (r − RL ) ≤ 0.
Taking the second derivative yields:
b¯ν 2 =
2(X − h)
ν3 (r − RL ) ≥ 0,
which implies that b¯ (h,ν ) is decreasing and convex.
We can plot curves for b∗ (h,ν ) and b¯ (h,ν ) in (ν ,b) space to illustrate how the opti-
mal and maximum bailout fractions depend on the proportion of banks that are insolvent.
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Figure 1.2: Ex Post Bailout Fraction b as a Function of the Proportion ν of Insolvent Banks.
Since b∗ (h,0) = 0 and b¯ (h,0) = 1 for all values of h, and b∗ν (h,ν ) ≥ 0 and b¯ν (h,ν ) ≤ 0
for all values of h and ν , there can be at most one crossing of these curves. If they do not
cross, then the government’s resource constraint is never binding and so b (h,ν ) = b∗ (h,ν )
regardless of how many banks are insolvent. In this case, b (h,ν ) will be concave every-
where.
If the curves do cross, as in Figure 1.2, then there will be a kink in the b (h,ν ) curve
at ν∗ (h) ≡ arg maxν b (h,ν ), the insolvency fraction at which the ex post bailout fraction
is maximized. To the le of this kink, b (h,ν ) will take on the concavity of b∗ (h,ν ); to the
right of the kink, b (h,ν ) will take on the convexity of b¯ (h,ν ). ese properties of b (h,ν )
will be important for the determination of equilibrium.
We have seen in Section 1.3.2 above that the ex post optimal bailout fraction is decreas-
ing in the government’s ex ante investment in its bank resolution authority: b∗h (h,ν ) ≤ 0.
By again focusing on the region in which b¯ < 1, we can show that the same is true of the
maximum aordable bailout fraction:
b¯h (h,ν ) = − 1
ν (r − RL ) < 0.
is shows that it is still the case when the government’s resources are limited that it
can commit to a lower ex post bailout fraction by investing more in its bank resolution
authority.
For the special cases in which banks’ risky asset returns are exogenously xed as ei-
ther perfectly correlated or independent, the equilibrium outcomes can be determined
straightforwardly. e no-gambling condition in these cases is the same as (1.10) above,
but now bˆ ≡ E (b | Ri = RL ) and λˆ(h,ρ) ≡ E (λ(h,ρ) | Ri = RL ) must take into account the
possibility that the government may be budget constrained, i.e. that the ex post bailout
fraction b may not be the optimal fraction b∗ but instead be the maximum aordable frac-
tion b¯.
In the former case, a given bank will be insolvent if and only if all banks are insolvent.
erefore we will have ν = 0 for a fraction θ of the states of the world and ν = 1 for
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the remaining 1 − θ states. e expected probability of a given insolvent bank receiving
a bailout is therefore b (h,1), and the associated recovery fraction (for those banks that do
not receive a bailout) is λ
(
h,1 − b (h,1)
)
.
When asset returns are independent, the existence of a continuum of banks guarantees
that the proportion that become insolvent is 1−θ in every state of the world. e expected
probability of receiving a bailout conditional on being insolvent is therefore b (h,1−θ ), and
the associated recovery fraction is λ
(
h, (1−θ )
(
1−b (h,1−θ )
))
. For both these special cases,
the government can use these expressions along with equation (1.10) to nd the critical
investment level hP at which gambling ceases to be protable, and determine whether this
investment is worthwhile.
1.3.4 Production Sector with Distortionary Taxation
In this section we will incorporate into the model a production sector with distortionary
taxation, allowing us to microfound the reduced-form parameter η that represented the
cost of bailouts in the basic model. We will show that the key results derived above con-
tinue to hold in this more explicit version of the model.
Suppose now that all investors are also workers, who supply labour to competitive
rms. Workers’ period utility functions are increasing and linear in consumption, c , and
decreasing and strictly concave in labour supply, n:
u (c,n) = c −v (n) , with v ′(n) > 0, v ′′(n) > 0 and v ′′′(n) ≥ 0.
Workers’ lifetime utility is given by U = ∑∞t=0 β u (c,n), where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount
factor. Since utility is linear in consumption, there will be no wealth eects on labour sup-
ply. Furthermore, since there is no inter-period storage technology and utility is additively
separable across time, there is no intertemporal substitution to consider. is means the
optimal labour supply, n∗, will be that which satises the rst-order condition equating
the post-tax real wage, (1 − τ )w , to the marginal disutility of labour supply, v ′(n).
All rms have access to the same constant-returns-to-scale technology f (n) = z n,
which is increasing and linear in labour supply, n: f ′(n) = z > 0 and f ′′(n) = 0. e
capital stock is xed, identical across rms and normalized to one. Since the production
sector is perfectly competitive, the pre-tax real wage, w , will equal the marginal product
of labour, f ′(n) = z. Combining this with the rst-order condition above gives us the
following optimality condition for workers:
(1 − τ )z = v ′(n∗). (1.12)
Since z is a constant, we can see that the optimal labour supply, n∗, will depend only upon
the contemporaneous tax rate, τ . Moreover, since v ′′(n) > 0, the optimal labour supply
must be strictly decreasing in the tax rate: n∗′(τ ) < 0.
e government sets the income tax rate aer banks’ investment returns have been
realized and before workers choose their labour supply. It must pay for its up-front in-
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vestment in the bank resolution authority, h, and for the cost of any bank bailouts. We
assume that the government can borrow at a risk-free gross interest rate of one within
each period, but is subject to a balanced-budget requirement at the end of each period.
Since income taxes are distortionary, the government will choose the minimum tax rate
compatible with raising the necessary level of revenue, X , that is, it will choose the tax
rate on the le of the Laer curve:
τ ≡ min τ s.t. τ z n∗ (τ ) = X ≡ h + д(1 − θ )b (r − RL ).
e government’s chosen tax rate, τ , depends on its level of expenditure, X , which in turn
depends on the investment in the bank resolution authority, h, and the bailout fraction, b.
As above, the government cares about the total value of resources under its jurisdiction,
but now it also accounts for the disutility associated with labour eort. e government’s
objective function becomes:
V = −h + д
(
θRH + (1 − θ )
(
b + (1 − b)λ(h)
)
RL
)
+ (1 − д)S + z n∗ (τ ) −v
(
n∗ (τ )
)
.
Leing X¯ ≡ maxτ τ z n∗ (τ ) denote the maximum expenditure the government can aord,
we have the following expression for the maximum fraction of insolvent banks the gov-
ernment can bail out:
b¯ ≡ min
{
X¯ − h
д(1 − θ ) (r − RL ) ,1
}
. (1.13)
Once investment decisions have been made and banks’ returns have been realized, the
government’s ex post maximization problem is:
max
b≤b¯
д(1 − θ )
(
b + (1 − b)λ(h)
)
RL + z n
∗
(
τ
(
X (h,b)
))
−v
(
n∗
(
τ
(
X (h,b)
)))
. (1.14)
Proposition 5. In the extendedmodel with production and distortionary taxation, the ex post
bailout fractionb = min
{
b∗,b¯
}
is weakly decreasing in the government’s up-front investment
in its bank resolution authority, h.
Proof. We proceed by rst demonstrating thatb∗′(h) < 0, and then showing that b¯ ′(h) ≤ 0.
e rst-order condition associated with (1.14) is:
д(1 − θ )
((
1 − λ(h)
)
RL + (r − RL )
(
z −v ′(n∗)
)
n∗′(τ ) τ ′(X )
)
= 0,
which implicitly denes the optimal bailout fraction, b∗. Totally dierentiating this con-
dition with respect to the up-front investment, h, gives:
д(1 − θ )*,(r − RL )
((
n∗′(τ ) τ ′′(X ) + n∗′′(τ ) τ ′(X )2
) (
z −v ′(n∗)
)
. . .
. . . −
(
n∗′(τ ) τ ′(X )
)2
v ′′(n∗)
) (
1 + д(1 − θ ) (r − RL )b∗′(h)
)
− RLλ′(h)+- = 0.
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Rearranging, we have:
b∗′(h) =
A − 1
д(1 − θ ) (r − RL ) ,
where
A ≡ RL λ
′(h)
(r − RL )
((
n∗′(τ ) τ ′′(X ) + n∗′′(τ ) τ ′(X )2
) (
z −v ′(n∗)
)
−
(
(n∗′(τ ) τ ′(X )
)2
v ′′(n∗)
) .
We wish to show that b∗′(h) < 0. We have д(1 − θ ) > 0, since the bailout frac-
tion b∗ is only dened when the fraction of insolvent banks is strictly positive. We also
have r − RL > 0, since RL is the lowest possible return, and competition in the banking
sector will drive the interest rate, r , above this. We have already assumed that λ′(h) ≥ 0,
that is, investments in the bank resolution authority always weakly improve the recov-
ery fraction. From the representative worker’s optimality condition (1.12), it follows that
z −v ′(n∗) > 0. Furthermore, the optimal labour supply is strictly decreasing in the tax
rate, so n∗′(τ ) < 0. e marginal disutility of labour eort is increasing by assumption,
so v ′′(n∗) > 0. e squared terms must clearly be positive, so all that remains in order to
show that b∗′(h) < 0 is to show that n∗′′(τ ) ≤ 0 and τ ′′(X ) ≤ 0.
Totally dierentiating the representative worker’s optimality condition (1.12) twice
with respect to the tax rate, τ , and rearranging gives us:
n∗′′(τ ) = −
(
n∗′(τ )
)2
v ′′′(n∗)
v ′′(n∗)
≤ 0.
Now consider the government’s balanced-budget constraint τ z n∗ (τ ) = X . Totally dif-
ferentiating this twice with respect to the level of expenditure, X , and rearranging gives
us:
τ ′′(X ) =
(
2n∗′(τ ) + τ n∗′′(τ )
)
τ ′(X )
z
(
n∗ (τ ) + τ n∗′(τ )
)2 < 0.
(Since the government chooses the tax rate on the le of the Laer curve, we must have
τ ′(X ) > 0.)
Having shown that b∗′(h) < 0, all that remains is to show that b¯ ′(h) ≤ 0. By inspect-
ing (1.13), we can see that b¯ is strictly decreasing in h whenever X¯ −h < д(1− θ ) (r − RL ),
and invariant to h elsewhere. 
1.4 Conclusion
e model presented in this paper demonstrates that an ecient bank resolution regime
can indeed reduce moral hazard in the nancial sector. Under certain parameter values,
the government’s optimal investment in such a regime is higher than it would be if it
could costlessly commit to a no-bailout policy. e purpose of this investment is to make
the government’s no-bailout commitment credible, and thus deter banks from gambling.
Indeed, under the maintained assumption that prudent banks never fail, the resolution
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regime will never be used in equilibrium. us, although the direct eect of improved
bank resolution is to reduce the ex post costs of bank failures, its most important eect
may be the indirect one of reducing the ex ante probability of such failures.
When the likelihood of bailouts depends on how many banks become insolvent at once,
there can be strategic complementarities in banks’ risk-taking decisions that give rise to
multiple equilibria. In such environments, a suciently eective bank resolution authority
may be able to eliminate equilibria in which banks gamble because they expect others to
do so. However, if banks’ asset returns are highly correlated, the resolution authority may
have to be able to cope with severe nancial crises in order to make the government’s
commitment to avoid bailouts credible. When the government’s resources are limited, the
bank resolution authority is no longer needed as a commitment device in severe nancial
crises: the unaordability of bailouts does the work instead.
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Chapter 2
Public Debt and the Cyclicality of
Fiscal Policy
is chapter was wrien jointly with Antoine Camous.
2.1 Introduction
Public debt to GDP ratios in advanced economies have been rising since the mid-1970s,
and have recently reached levels not seen since just aer World War II (Abbas et al., 2011).
e recent nancial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession exacerbated this trend through
bailouts, stimulus packages, rising unemployment claims, and falling tax revenues. is
has led to a heated debate over the pace of scal consolidation, with one side emphasizing
the burden on economic growth imposed by high levels of public debt, and the other warn-
ing that pursuing austerity during a recession could be very costly or even self-defeating.
In this paper we present a new theory that provides a partial reconciliation of these
two views. We show that there is a threshold level of debt above which the economy is
vulnerable to self-fullling scal crises. However, the mechanism that makes such crises
possible is that scal policy becomes procyclical, in the sense that the government’s op-
timal response to a reduction in output is to raise the tax rate.1 us, our model lends
qualied support to both sides of the debate over scal consolidation: the proximate cause
of the crisis is the government’s desire to raise the tax rate in a recession, but the source
of this desire is the high level of public debt.
In Calvo (1988) and related papers,2 investors’ expectations of sovereign default cause
them to charge a risk premium that makes default more likely. Corsei et al. (2013) argue
that this sovereign risk channel provides a motivation for scal consolidation. However,
even countries that did not face an increase in sovereign risk premia have pursued scal
consolidation in the years since the onset of the Great Recession. Our focus in this pa-
1Since “procyclical” can be used to describe both variables that are positively correlated with output and
policies that exacerbate the business cycle, there is potential for ambiguity when describing the cyclicality of
tax rates. roughout this paper, we use “procyclical” to refer to a negative correlation of tax rates and output,
that is, tax policy that could exacerbate output uctuations.
2See also Cooper (2015) and Lorenzoni and Werning (2013), for instance.
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per is not on self-fullling expectations of sovereign default, but on another type of self-
fullling macroeconomic crisis caused by high levels of public debt. Accordingly, we focus
on cases in which investors charge the lowest risk premium compatible with the econ-
omy’s fundamentals. Our analysis can explain why a highly indebted government might
adopt procyclical scal policy during a recession, even without facing a high sovereign risk
premium. Indeed, in our baseline model debt is risk free because the government never
defaults, and debt sustainability is ensured by future scal capacity.3
Unlike a commied Ramsey planner, the government in our model takes households’
current labour supply decisions and output as given when seing the contemporaneous
tax rate and issuing new debt. Fiscal policy is therefore a function of current output, as well
as of the inherited stock of public debt. is leads to a standard time inconsistency problem
of the kind identied by Kydland and Presco (1977). Whatever the level of public debt,
the government always chooses a higher contemporaneous tax rate than a Ramsey planner
would choose, because it does not internalize the distortionary eect on current output.
However, the key insight of our analysis is that the government’s inability to commit to a
tax rate can have even more severe consequences, because when debt is high scal policy
becomes procyclical, thereby inducing a coordination problem among households.
When the economy suers a fall in output, there are two countervailing eects on
the government’s optimal choice of the contemporaneous tax rate. e rst is that, for
given tax rates, contemporaneous consumption falls relative to future consumption. is
provides the government with a consumption-smoothing motive to reduce the contempora-
neous tax rate relative to the future tax rate.4 e second eect, which we call the tax-base
eect, is that the contemporaneous tax base shrinks, meaning that the government must
raise tax rates at some point in order to remain solvent in the long run.
When the inherited stock of public debt is low, the consumption-smoothing eect dom-
inates. is means scal policy is countercyclical: the government’s optimal response to a
fall in output is to cut the tax rate and issue more debt, postponing the necessary tax col-
lection to the future. A household that expected aggregate labour supply to be low would
therefore anticipate a low tax rate, and choose a high level of labour supply itself. Under
these conditions there is no scope for coordination failure, and our economy has a unique
equilibrium.
However, when the inherited level of public debt is high, the tax-base eect dominates.
Optimal scal policy then becomes procyclical, because deferring all scal consolidation
(tax increases) when output is low would impose an unacceptable burden on future con-
sumption. is unleashes the possibility of multiple equilibria. In the good equilibrium,
labour supply is high because workers anticipate a low tax rate, and the government op-
timally chooses a low tax rate because output is high. In bad equilibria, which we label
scal policy traps, workers restrict their labour supply in anticipation of a high tax rate,
3We show in section 2.5.2 that our results are robust to allowing for government default.
4In our baseline model we abstract away from private-sector borrowing decisions, but this consumption-
smoothing motive applies whenever consumers are not fully Ricardian. We relax this assumption in section
2.5.3.
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and the resulting low output induces the government to full their pessimistic expecta-
tions by seing a high tax rate. Welfare is lower in scal policy trap equilibria than in the
high tax-base, low tax-rate equilibrium.
e idea that high levels of public debt can pose a threat to the economy is most fa-
mously associated with Reinhart and Rogo (2010). In particular, they argue that countries
with sovereign debt to GDP ratios above 90 percent have signicantly lower rates of eco-
nomic growth on average. e burden of distortionary taxation imposed by debt service
could explain why high levels of debt might reduce growth, but not why there might be a
discrete drop in growth above some threshold level of debt. Our model contributes a novel
explanation for why there might be such a threshold eect, based on self-fullling beliefs
about the stance of scal policy. In our model, a country with a level of public debt just
above the threshold is exposed to the risk of a high-tax, low-output equilibrium. If this
equilibrium is selected, the country’s economic performance will be signicantly worse
than that of a similar country with a public debt level just below the threshold.
Schmi-Grohe´ and Uribe (1997) introduce similar concerns about taxpayer coordi-
nation failure into a dynamic model with income and capital taxation. ey consider
only balanced-budget scal policy: specically, they study the undesired consequences
of balanced-budget rules when labour supply and tax rates are chosen simultaneously.
In addition to procyclical scal policy, they show that this leads to equilibrium indeter-
minacy. e authors stress the crucial role of capital accumulation in driving the result.
Finally, they consider the role of public debt, but not as a choice variable: they maintain
budget balance and a xed stock of public debt, so what maers are the interest rates that
have to be serviced. Nevertheless, high levels of debt in their analysis can lead to scal
policy indeterminacy.
Cole and Kehoe (2000) consider a dynamic environment in which the government is
prone to self-fullling debt rollover crises. ey assume a constant tax rate, and allow
the government to adjust its debt level by varying its expenditure. In their model, there
is a source of domestically initiated crisis, via capital accumulation. By reducing saving,
households reduce capital next period and bring the economy into the crisis zone where
market shutdown is an option, hence making the initial belief that drove the reduction in
saving self-fullling.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we present the general
framework of analysis. Section 2.3 sets out our main analytical results. Next, in section 2.4,
we illustrate by way of an example the mechanism by which the cyclicality of scal policy
depends on the inherited debt position and can lead to a self-fullling crisis. In section 2.5,
we build on this example to investigate the robustness of our results to relaxing several of
our baseline assumptions. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 A Model of Taxpayer Coordination Failure
In this section, we rst outline the mechanism by which taxpayer coordination failure can
arise in a static environment, and then present the general framework of our dynamic
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Figure 2.1: Equilibria on Either Side of the Laer Curve
is gure outlines the coordination problem created by the government’s inability to commit to a tax rate.
For a given level of government expenditure, there are two levels of labour supply, associated with dierent
tax rates, that satisfy the government budget constraint. e equilibrium with high labour supply and a low
tax rate provides higher utility than the one with low labour supply and a high tax rate.
analysis.
2.2.1 Static Economy with a Balanced Budget
Consider a static environment, as proposed by Cooper (1999, 131–132), in which the gov-
ernment must nance a xed level of expenditureG through a proportional ex post tax on
labour income.5 e economy is populated by a mass-one continuum of ex ante identical
households, indexed by i ∈ [0,1], who derive utility from consumption, ci , and disutility
from labour supply, ni . Production is linear, so with a proportional tax rate τ , household
i’s consumption is ci = (1−τ )ni . Since the pre-tax real wage is xed at unity, households’
optimal labour supply will be a function of the tax rate: ni = n(τ ). We assume that the sub-
stitution eect dominates the income eect in the utility function, so that labour supply is
decreasing in the tax rate: dn(τ )/dτ < 0.
e government’s budget balance constraint is τn = G, where n =
∫
i nidi is aggregate
labour supply. e government must pay for its xed expenditure, so the tax rate will
depend negatively on the tax base: τ = G/n. is creates strategic complementarities
among households: the higher is aggregate labour supply, the lower will be the tax rate,
and so the higher is household i’s optimal labour supply.
e equilibrium condition is τn(τ ) = G. As Figure 2.1 shows, there are two Pareto-
ranked equilibria: a good equilibrium with a low tax rate τG and high labour supply n(τG ),
and a bad equilibrium with a high tax rate τ B and low labour supply n(τ B ). Given the
presence of strategic uncertainty over the tax rate, households may coordinate on the
inecient Nash equilibrium, which lies on the downward-sloping part of the Laer curve.
If the government could credibly commit to a tax rate, this strategic uncertainty among
households would disappear. However, in a static environment with xed expenditure,
5We can think of G as pre-contracted expenses that do not enter into household utility directly.
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the government has no choice but to respond to a revenue shortfall by raising the tax rate.
e combination of discretion over the tax rate and an absolute requirement to balance
the budget leads to the possibility of coordination failure. e rst of these assumptions
is reasonable: sovereign governments cannot in fact commit to keep tax rates constant
regardless of the state of the economy.6 However, the balanced-budget view of scal policy
is less realistic because governments routinely borrow to cover revenue shortfalls when
output is lower than expected (and even balanced-budget constitutional amendments can
be overturned).
e focus of the present paper is therefore to oer the government the possibility
to issue new debt rather than increase taxes in the event of a revenue shortfall. Does
this allow the government to eliminate the taxpayer coordination failure and steer the
economy to the more ecient outcome with a low tax rate and high labour supply? Our
answer will be that this depends on the inherited debt level. If the outstanding debt burden
is suciently low, then the government’s ability to adjust its debt position in the event of
a revenue shortfall will ensure that there is a unique, low-tax equilibrium. However, if
the inherited stock of debt is large enough then the government will optimally respond to
lower output with higher taxes, unleashing the possibility of a scal policy trap.
2.2.2 Two-Period Economy with Taxes and Debt Issuance
We consider a two-period economy: t = 1,2. e government inherits a level of debt
B1, owed to foreign investors. In period 1, households choose labour supply and produce
accordingly. e government then sets its scal policy, choosing the tax rate on labour
income τ1 and the new debt B2 to be issued to foreign investors. is debt is backed by
future primary scal surpluses and is always repaid in period 2, so the government can
borrow at the risk-free rate R between periods 1 and 2. We interpret the terminal period 2
as the long run.
e focus of our analysis is on the determinants of labour supply and scal policy in
period 1. We next describe these choices.
Households’ Preferences and Choices
ere is a unit mass of households in the economy, indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Households live
over the two periods but are hand-to-mouth consumers, meaning they can neither save
nor borrow between periods 1 and 2.7 Moreover, since households are atomistic, they do
not internalize the impact of their labour supply choices on the government’s choices of
tax rate and debt issuance. In period 1, household i forms a belief about the tax rate τ1 and
6Income tax policy can change relatively quickly, particularly during crises, and even retroactive tax
increases are not unheard of. On 6 November 2012, voters in California passed Proposition 30, which included
increases in top marginal tax rates that applied retroactively to income earned since 1 January 2012. e
Minnesota omnibus tax bill (HF 677), signed into law on 23 May 2013, included a new top income tax bracket
and an increase in the alternative minimum tax rate, both of which applied retroactively to the beginning of
2013.
7We explore the implications of relaxing this assumption in section 2.5.3 below.
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solves:
max
n1,i
u (c1,i ) − д(n1,i ) (2.1)
subject to
c1,i = (1 − τ1)z1 f (n1,i ). (2.2)
Consumption utility is increasing and concave: u ′(·) > 0 and u ′′(·) < 0; and labour disu-
tility is increasing and convex: д′(·) > 0 and д′′(·) < 0.
e individual production function is y1,i = z1 f (n1,i ), where z1 > 0 is an aggregate
productivity parameter and f (·) is an increasing function that exhibits weakly decreasing
returns to scale and is unbounded above: f ′(·) > 0, f ′′(·) ≤ 0 and limn→+∞ f (·) = +∞.
e labour supply decision n(τ1) is implicitly dened by the following rst-order con-
dition:
(1 − τ1)z1 f ′(n1,i )u ′
(
(1 − τ1)z1 f (n1,i )
)
= д′(n1,i ). (2.3)
We assume that the curvature of the utility function is such that substitution eects dom-
inate income eects:
u ′(c ) + cu ′′(c ) > 0 ∀c ≥ 0.
is ensures that labour supply is a decreasing function of the tax rate:
dn(τ1)
dτ1
=
z1 f
′(·)
(
u ′(·) + c1u ′′(·)
)
(1 − τ1)z1 f ′′(·)u ′(·) +
(
(1 − τ1)z1 f ′(·)
)2
u ′′(·) − д′′(·)
< 0. (2.4)
Government’s Preferences and Choices
e government faces an intertemporal tax-smoothing problem. It has an inherited stock
of debt owed to foreign investors, B1, which it is commied to repaying. In each period, the
government also has to nance an exogenous amount of expenses Gt ≥ 0, which do not
enter into household utility directly.8 Given inherited debt B1 and aggregate labour supply
n1, it optimally sets the tax rate τ1 and issues new debt B2 to risk-neutral foreign investors.
Importantly, the choice of B2 is constrained by the requirement that all outstanding debt
is repaid in period 2.9 Future scal capacity is dened by the maximum amount of debt B¯2
that can be issued in period 1.
8In section 2.5.1, we endogenize short-run public expenditure G1.
9is assumption is introduced to highlight the fact that the mechanism at play in our analysis, namely the
link between inherited debt, the cyclicality of scal policy and the possibility of taxpayer coordination failure,
is not driven by self-fullling increases in sovereign risk premia. In section 2.5.2, we relax this assumption
and show that our results still hold.
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e government’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
τ1,B2
u (c1) − д(n1) + βV (B2) (2.5)
subject to
B1 +G1 ≤ τ1z1 f (n1) + B2
R
(2.6)
B2 ≤ B¯2. (2.7)
e function V (·) captures the continuation utility of the economy when in period 1 the
government issues bonds with face value B2 to be repaid in period 2. e government
budget constraint (2.6) states that debt service and government expenditure in period 1
must be nanced by proportional taxes on output and new debt issuance. Expression (2.7)
states that, because of the long-run solvency requirement, the government also faces a
borrowing limit B¯2.
e continuation utility function V (·) satises the following concavity assumptions:
V ′(·) < 0, V ′′(·) < 0. (2.8)
In addition, we impose
lim
B2→B¯2
V ′(·) = −∞. (2.9)
is condition ensures that the government’s borrowing limit (2.7) will not bind in equi-
librium (see Lemma 1 below).10
Since V (·) is decreasing in B2, the government budget constraint (2.6) will be satised
with equality. Substituting this into the government’s objective function (2.5) and dieren-
tiating with respect to the short-run tax rate τ1 yields the following rst-order condition:
u ′
(
(1 − τ1)z1 f (n1)
)
= −βRV ′
(
R (B1 +G1 − τ1z1 f (n1))
)
. (2.10)
Equation (2.10) implicitly denes the tax policy function τ (n1,B1).11 We will demon-
strate below that the optimal short-run tax rate is unambiguously increasing in the inher-
ited debt level B1, but that the sign of its derivative with respect to short-run labour supply
n1 is ambiguous. When dτ (·)/dn1 > 0, we say that scal policy is countercyclical, meaning
a drop in output induces the government to lower the tax rate; when dτ (·)/dn1 < 0, we
say that scal policy is procyclical, meaning a drop in output induces the government to
raise the tax rate. We will also show that the cyclicality of scal policy and the number of
equilibria in this economy depend on the inherited level of debt.
10Condition (2.9) states that the marginal utility of a reduction in the future debt burden approaches in-
nity as the government approaches its debt limit. We demonstrate below that this condition is satised for
natural specications ofV (·) in which the cost of issuing additional debt in period 1 is higher taxes and lower
consumption in period 2.
11For comparison, a Ramsey planner with the ability to commit to a tax rate would solve (2.5) subject to
(2.6), (2.7) and the additional constraint n1 = n(τ1), implicitly dened by (2.3).
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Equilibrium Denition
e relevant choices of households and the government are both made in period 1. e
government inherits an amount of debt B1. Households form expectations about scal
policy, supply labour and produce accordingly. Given its outstanding debt and the econ-
omy’s tax base, the government sets scal policy to maximize the lifetime utility of the
population.
e relevant variables for the government’s decisions are aggregate labour supply, n1,
and the inherited amount of debt B1. Given (n1,B1), the government sets τ1 and issues new
bonds B2. We denote the policy functions τ (n1,B1) and B (n1,B1). In the long run, i.e. in
period 2, debt is fully repaid.
Accordingly, an equilibrium in this environment is dened as follows:
Denition. A subgame-perfect rational expectations equilibrium is a labour supply decision
n1, a tax rate τ1 and debt issuance B2 such that:
- Given outstanding debt B1, households form rational expectations about scal policy,
and supply labour n1 to maximize their intratemporal utility (2.1).
- Given (n1,B1), the government sets the tax rate τ1 and issues debt B2 to maximize
aggregate lifetime utility (2.5) subject to its budget constraint (2.6) and borrowing limit
(2.7).
Some comments are in order. First, we spell out the game and equilibrium denition as
sequential actions, where households supply labour and then the government sets taxes.
Similar economic interactions would prevail if moves were simultaneous. On the other
hand, it is essential that the government does not move rst. Indeed, if the government
had a way to act as a Stackelberg leader and commit to its policy, it would naturally solve
the coordination problem by choosing a tax rate on the le-hand side of the Laer curve.
Second, although the government takes labour supply as given and therefore does not
face a Laer curve, Nash equilibrium requires consistency between the tax rate the private
sector expects and the tax rate the government chooses. All equilibria must therefore be
on the labour income Laer curve, but not all points on the Laer curve will be equilibria.
More importantly, the analysis will unveil conditions under which the equilibrium
is unique or not. If the policy functions of households and the scal authority exhibit
substitutability, which we interpret as scal policy being countercyclical, then there will
be a unique equilibrium. If instead they exhibit complementarity, i.e. if scal policy is
procyclical, then there may be multiple equilibria.12
e next section is dedicated to deriving conditions on the inherited level of debt that
give rise to complementarities and create the possibility of scal policy traps.
12Formally, since dn(·)/dτ < 0, the policy functions exhibit complementarities if and only if dτ (·)/dn ≤ 0.
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2.3 Analysis
is section establishes the key result of the paper, namely that the level of debt is critical
to the cyclicality of scal policy and can induce complementarities that give rise to scal
policy traps. e argument is built on a geometric interpretation of the model in (n1,τ1)
space.13 Equilibria in this environment can be represented by intersections of the labour
supply function n(τ1) and the tax policy function τ (n1,B1). We will show that there are
three threshold levels of inherited debt, B∗1 ≤ Bˆ1 < B¯1, such that when B1 < B∗1 a unique
equilibrium is guaranteed, when Bˆ1 < B1 < B¯1 there will be multiple equilibria, and when
B1 > B¯1 there will not be any equilibria. is result will support our key idea that the level
of debt is critical in creating the potential for self-fullling scal crises.
We begin by characterising the labour supply function, which is everywhere down-
ward sloping and invariant to the inherited debt stockB1. We then characterize the govern-
ment’s tax policy function, starting with the limits imposed by the government’s budget
constraint and borrowing limit. Unlike the labour supply function, the tax policy func-
tion’s position and slope does depend on the inherited debt stock B1.
We then show that when inherited debt is suciently low (B1 < B∗1), the tax policy
function will be upward sloping (countercyclical) at least until it crosses the labour supply
function, thereby ensuring a unique equilibrium. en, we demonstrate that when the
inherited amount of debt is high enough that the repayment of newly issued debt cannot
be met without tax revenues in period 1 (Bˆ1 < B1 < B¯1), then the tax policy function
will cross the labour supply function at least twice. is situation gives rise to multiple
equilibria.
We conclude this section with an economic explanation of why the slope of the tax
policy function is ambiguous and depends on the inherited debt stock B1. We decompose
the government’s optimal response to a change in labour supply into two countervailing
eects: a tax-base eect and a consumption-smoothing eect.
2.3.1 Properties of the Labour Supply Function
From (2.4) we know that labour supply is a monotonically decreasing function of the tax
rate, so the labour supply function n(τ1) is downward sloping in (n1,τ1) space. Optimal
labour supply is zero when the tax rate is 100 percent, and n(0) > 0 when the tax rate is
zero. e labour supply function starts at (0,1) and cuts the horizontal axis at (n(0),0). It
continues below the horizontal axis, because greater eort can be induced by negative tax
rates (i.e. labour income subsidies).
Optimal labour supply depends only on the tax rate τ1, so the labour supply function
will be unaected by changes in the inherited debt stock B1 or in the government’s debt
issuance B2. Figure 2.2 summarizes the properties of n(τ1), the reaction function of house-
holds.
13e geometric approach is very convenient, both for preserving generality of the results and for con-
veying the main intuitions underlying our analysis.
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Figure 2.2: Labour Supply Function
2.3.2 Properties of the Tax Policy Function
e number of intersections (and hence the number of equilibria) will therefore depend on
the shape of the tax policy function, which, as we will show in this section, does depend
on the debt stock B1 as well as on the quantity of labour supplied, n1. We will show that
changes in B1 both shi the tax policy function and alter its slope, thereby aecting the
number of equilibria.
Constraints on the Government’s Choice of Tax Rate
Let us rst consider the constraints the government faces. e borrowing limit B¯2 in (2.7)
is the highest level of debt that the government can feasibly repay in period 2 (oen re-
ferred to in the literature as the “natural” borrowing limit). is of course depends on the
government’s scal capacity in period 2. Let the maximum rollover threshold debt level,
Bˆ1 = B¯2/R −G1, (2.11)
be the inherited debt level at which the government is exactly solvent in period 2 if it col-
lects zero revenue in period 1. For debt levels strictly above this threshold, the government
cannot repay its debts in period 2 without collecting some tax revenue in period 1. For debt
levels strictly below this threshold, on the other hand, the government can in fact aord
to subsidize labour supply in period 1 by seing a negative income tax rate τ1 < 0 and still
be solvent in period 2.14
For now, we only consider equilibria in which the government repays its debts in pe-
riod 2. Accordingly, we dene the lower bound on short-run labour supply n(B1) as the
level of short-run labour supply at or below which the government’s scal policy is not
14Note that for large enough G1, the threshold Bˆ1 will be negative, meaning that the government must
inherit net claims on foreign wealth in order to be able to aord not to collect any revenue in period 1.
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well dened because repayment of the debt is not feasible. Formally, we have:
n(B1) =

f −1
(
B1−Bˆ1
z1
)
if B1 > Bˆ1,
0 if B1 ≤ Bˆ1.
Since it is the short-run tax rate that maers for labour supply decisions, it will be
convenient to rewrite the government’s constraints in terms of this tax rate. We dene the
minimum short-run tax rate τ (n1,B1) as the tax rate in period 1 that, given the inherited
debt level B1, the economy’s tax basey1 = z1 f (n1) and the government’s budget constraint
(2.6), requires the government to issue debt up to its borrowing limit B¯2. e tax rate τ (·)
is therefore the lowest tax rate in period 1 such that full repayment of the public debt is
feasible in period 2. As the borrowing limit depends on the government’s long-run scal
capacity, so will the minimum short-run tax rate. Formally, using the government budget
constraint, τ (·) is given by:
τ (n1,B1) =
B1 − Bˆ1
z1 f (n1)
, n1 > 0, n1 ≥ n(B1).
Figure 2.3 illustrates the characterisation of the minimum short-run tax rate τ (·). As
the inherited debt level B1 increases, for a given labour supply n1, the tax rate must rise to
ensure long-run solvency, so the curve shis up. If B1 > Bˆ1, positive short-run tax revenue
is needed to ensure long-run solvency, but the higher is the short-run labour supply n1, the
lower is the minimum tax rate. If B1 < Bˆ1, the government can aord to set negative rates
τ1 < 0 (i.e. to subsidize labour), but the higher is the short-run labour supply, the smaller
this subsidy has to be. For B1 = Bˆ1, no short-run revenue is needed to ensure long-run
solvency, but the government cannot aord subsidies, either.
Of course, if the inherited level of debt B1 is too high, the government will be unable
to raise enough revenue to remain solvent, and there will be no equilibrium. Clearly, if the
required revenue in period 1 exceeds that which would be raised at the peak of the Laer
curve, repayment will not be feasible. However, the maximum inherited debt level that can
be sustained in equilibrium is less than this level. e government’s lack of commitment
reduces the amount of tax revenue it can raise in equilibrium.15
Accordingly, we dene B¯1 as the upper limit on the amount of inherited debt B1 that
the government can sustain in equilibrium. It is derived as follows. In equilibrium, house-
holds’ expectations of the tax rate in period 1 must be correct, and labour supply must be
optimal: n1 = n(τ1). Equilibrium also requires that the tax rate is set optimally given the
level of output and the inherited debt level, that is, τ1 = τ (n1,B1). Equilibrium tax revenue
in period 1 will therefore be given by the Laer curve τ1z1 f
(
n(τ1)
)
. erefore, the maxi-
mum inherited debt level B¯1 is such that, by raising the maximum tax revenue and issuing
the maximum amount of debt B¯2, the government has just enough resources to nance
its spending G1 in period 1. It is the highest level of inherited debt B1 that satises the
15If workers were to supply the amount of labour consistent with the peak of the Laer curve, the gov-
ernment would optimally choose to raise the tax rate.
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Figure 2.3: Minimum Short-Run Tax Rate τ (n1,B1)
is gure summarizes the constraints on the government’s optimization problem. It displays the minimum
short-run tax rate induced by inherited public debt, labour supply and future scal capacity.
following two equations:
R
(
B¯1 +G1 − τ (n1, B¯1)z1 f
(
n
(
τ (n1, B¯1)
)))
= B¯2,
τ1 = τ (n1, B¯1).
Borrowing Limit Does Not Bind in Equilibrium
We have now dened all the ingredients necessary to prove that the borrowing limit (2.7)
does not bind in equilibrium. is justies restricting our aention to interior solutions of
the government’s maximization problem. is point is formalized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. For all B1 < B¯1 and for all n1 > n(B1), we have B (n1,B1) < B¯2 and τ (n1,B1) >
τ (n1,B1). at is, the borrowing limit (2.7) does not bind, and the optimal short-run tax rate
is strictly greater than what is required for long-run solvency.
Proof. Suppose, on the way to a contradiction, that there exist B1 < B¯1 and n1 > n(B1)
such that the optimal debt issuance is B (n1,B1) = B¯2 and the optimal short-run tax rate
is τ (n1,B1) = τ (n1,B1). From (2.9), we have V ′(B¯2) = −∞. Given n1 > n(B1) and our
curvature assumptions on the utility function, for all τ1 < 1 we have u ′
(
(1−τ1)z1 f (n1)
)
<
+∞. e combination of V ′(·) = −∞ and u ′(·) < +∞ violates the government’s rst-
order condition (2.10). Given B1 < B¯1 and n1 > n(B1), it is feasible for the government
to raise the short-run tax rate to τ˜ ∈
(
τ (n1,B1),1
)
and reduce debt issuance to B˜2 < B¯2.
Relative to the candidate policy, this alternative policy produces an arbitrarily large long-
run marginal benet at a strictly nite short-run marginal cost, and so the candidate policy
B (n1,B1) = B¯2 and τ (n1,B1) = τ (n1,B1) cannot be optimal. 
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is Lemma tells us that the optimal short-run tax rate τ (n1,B1) will be the interior
solution implicitly dened by the rst-order condition (2.10). Since the government’s bud-
get constraint (2.6) will be satised with equality, the debt issuance decision B (n1,B1) will
be given by:
B2 = R
(
B1 +G1 − τ (n1,B1)z1 f (n1)
)
.
Since households’ decisions depend only on the tax rate τ1, we are interested mainly in the
properties of the tax policy function τ (n1,B1).
Optimal Tax Rate Is Increasing in Inherited Debt
We rst show that an increase in B1 induces an increase in the tax rate τ1 for any level of
labour supply n1.16
Lemma 2.
dτ (n1,B1)
dB1
=
βR2V ′′(·)
z1 f (n1)
(
u ′′(·) + βR2V ′′(·)
) > 0. (2.12)
Proof. e expression is derived by totally dierentiating the government’s rst-order con-
dition (2.10) with respect to B1 and rearranging. Standard assumptions on the curvature of
the utility functions,u ′′(·) < 0 andV ′′(·) < 0, guarantee that the expression is positive. 
e economic intuition behind this result is straightforward. An increase in the inher-
ited debt stock B1 means the government is poorer overall. In order to remain solvent, it
must raise taxes in period 1, period 2, or both. Given that the marginal utility of consump-
tion is decreasing in both periods, optimality requires the government to spread the pain
of an increase in B1 over both periods, meaning the short-run tax rate τ1 must rise.
Tax Policy Function Is Upward Sloping Whenever Negative
We are mainly interested in the slope of the tax policy function, that is, how the optimal
tax rate responds to changes in labour supply. Taking the total derivative of (2.10) with
respect to n1, we get:
dτ (n1,B1)
dn1
=
f ′(n1)
f (n1)
(
(1 − τ1)u ′′(·) − τ1βR2V ′′(·)
u ′′(·) + βR2V ′′(·)
)
. (2.13)
In general the sign of this expression will be ambiguous, and will depend on the in-
herited debt stock B1.17 However, the expression is unambiguously positive (and therefore
the tax policy function is upward sloping, i.e. countercyclical) whenever the short-run tax
rate τ1 is negative:
16In (n1,τ1) space, this feature is represented by an upward shi of the tax policy function as the inherited
debt stock B1 increases.
17In section 2.3.4 below, we provide some economic analysis of this ambiguity by decomposing the gov-
ernment’s response to a change in labour supply into a tax-base eect and a consumption-smoothing eect.
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Lemma 3.
dτ (n1,B1)
dn1
> 0 ∀τ (n1,B1) < 0.
Proof. Totally dierentiating the government’s rst-order condition (2.10) with respect to
n1 and rearranging yields:
dτ (n1,B1)
dn1
=
f ′(n1)
f (n1)
(
u ′′(c1)
u ′′(c1) + βR2V ′′(B2)
− τ (n1,B1)
)
.
Since β ≥ 0, u ′′(·) < 0 and V ′′(·) < 0, we have
u ′′(c1)
u ′′(c1) + βR2V ′′(B2)
∈ [0,1].
Since f (·) > 0 and f ′(·) > 0, the whole expression must be positive whenever τ (n1,B1) <
0. 
2.3.3 Equilibria
Combining the analysis of households’ labour supply function and the government’s tax
policy function, we are now ready to derive conditions under which the equilibrium of the
economy is unique or not, i.e. conditions under which scal policy traps can arise.
Unique EquilibriumWhen Debt Is Low
Combining Lemmas 2 and 3, we can show that there will be a unique equilibrium whenever
the inherited debt stock B1 is suciently low.
Proposition 6. Let B∗1 be such that τ
(
n(0),B∗1
)
= 0. en for all B1 < B∗1, there will be a
unique equilibrium.
Proof. From Lemma 2 we know that τ (n(0),B1) < τ
(
n(0),B∗1
)
= 0 for all B1 < B∗1, that
is, the optimal tax rate will be negative whenever labour supply is n(0) and inherited
debt is less than the threshold value B∗1. en from Lemma 3 we know that whenever
B1 < B
∗
1 the tax policy function will be negative valued and upward sloping for all values
of labour supply n1 ≤ n(0), and indeed will continue to slope upwards at least until it cuts
the horizontal axis. Before it does so, it will cut the (downward-sloping) labour supply
function exactly once. 
Multiple Equilibria When Debt Is High
e government’s budget constraint (2.6) means that if it inherits a suciently large stock
of debt B1, it will be forced to collect tax revenue in period 1 in order to stay within its
borrowing limit (2.7). Whenever the inherited debt level B1 is high enough that the govern-
ment must collect taxes in period 1 (but not so high that repayment becomes infeasible),
the economy will exhibit multiple equilibria.
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Figure 2.4: Existence of Fiscal Policy Traps
Proposition 7. Let Bˆ1 = B¯2/R −G1, where B¯2 is the natural borrowing limit, and let B¯1 be
the highest inherited debt level for which an equilibrium exists. en for all B1 ∈
(
Bˆ1, B¯1
)
,
the economy exhibits multiple equilibria.
Proof. For all B1 ∈
(
Bˆ1, B¯1
)
, we have τ
(
n(B1),B1
)
= τ
(
n(B1),B1
)
= 1 > n−1
(
n(B1)
)
.
at is, when inherited debt is above the maximum rollover threshold Bˆ1 and short-run
labour supply is at its minimum value n(·), the government’s optimal short-run tax rate is
100 percent, because this is the only feasible choice. We know that 100 percent is higher
than the tax rate that would induce labour supply of n(·) > 0, because labour supply is
decreasing in the tax rate and it is optimal not to work when the tax rate is 100 percent.
For all B1 ∈
(
Bˆ1, B¯1
)
, we have τ
(
n(0),B1
)
> τ
(
n(0),B1
)
> n−1
(
n(0)
)
= 0. is says
that, when inherited debt is above the maximum rollover threshold Bˆ1 and labour supply
is at the value that would optimally be chosen if the tax rate were zero, the optimal tax
rate is in fact strictly positive.
ese two pieces tell us that the optimal tax curve lies above the labour supply curve at
two points: when n1 is at the minimum level consistent with solvency, n(B1), and when n1
is at the point consistent with zero taxes, n(0). ere can’t be an equilibrium to the le of
(i.e. with a lower labour supply than) n(B1), because solvency would be violated whatever
scal policy the government chose. We also know that there can’t be an equilibrium to
the right of (i.e. with a higher labour supply than) n(0), because the labour supply curve
is negative valued aer that point, and τ (n1,B1) is strictly positive for all n1 whenever
B1 > Bˆ1. So if an equilibrium exists, it must be between n(B1) and n(0). Apart from the
special case of tangency (with B1 = B¯1), if the optimal tax curve crosses below the labour
supply curve somewhere to the right of n(B1), it must cross it again in order to be above
it at n(0). 
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Welfare Ordering of Equilibria
Proposition 8. e equilibria in Proposition 7 with higher labour supply n1 Pareto dominate
those with lower labour supply.
Proof. Since all households are ex ante identical and all equilibria are symmetric, the wel-
fare ordering of equilibria depends on the utility of the representative household.
All equilibria must lie on the labour supply curve n(τ1), which is downward sloping, so
equilibria featuring higher short-run labour supply n1 must also feature a lower short-run
tax rate τ1. e short-run tax rate τ1 enters into the household budget constraint (2.2), and
since labour supply cannot be negative, a reduction in τ1 expands the household’s choice
set, meaning the household is (weakly) beer o in period 1.
All that remains to be shown is that in equilibria with higher short-run labour supply,
the representative household is also beer o in period 2. Since V ′(B2) < 0, we need
to show that the government’s optimal debt issuance B2 is lower in equilibria featuring
higher short-run labour supply n1. To see this, note that optimal scal policy must satisfy
the rst-order condition (2.10):
u ′
(
(1 − τ1)z1 f (n1)
)
= −βV ′(B2).
Consider two equilibria, one “good” and one “bad”, with nG1 > nB1 and τG1 < τ B1 . Now
suppose (on the way to a contradiction) that the good equilibrium features higher debt is-
suance: BG2 > BB2 . en fromV ′′(B2) < 0 we haveV ′(BG2 ) < V ′(BB2 ), meaning−βV ′(BG2 ) >
−βV ′(BB2 ). In order for the government’s rst-order condition to be satised in both equi-
libria, we would therefore need u ′
(
(1 − τG1 )z1 f (nG1 )
)
> u ′
(
(1 − τ B1 )z1 f (nB1 )
)
. However,
given that output is increasing in labour supply andu ′′(·) < 0, this would require τG1 > τ B1 ,
which cannot be the case because by hypothesis the good equilibrium features a lower tax
rate. 
A lower tax rate in period 1 means households are wealthier in period 1. Since sub-
stitution eects dominate income eects, their response is to increase their labour supply,
which increases the government’s tax base. is induces a reduction in the government’s
optimal debt issuance, so households are wealthier in period 2 as well.
2.3.4 Tax-Base and Consumption-Smoothing Eects
In this subsection we provide some economic intuition for our main result that optimal s-
cal policy is procyclical when the burden of inherited debt is large. We do so by providing a
decomposition of the eect of a change in labour supply on the optimal tax rate. We iden-
tify two countervailing eects at play, which we label tax-base and consumption-smoothing
eects.
Consider a reduction in period 1 labour supplyn1. Ceteris paribus, this reduces period 1
consumption relative to period 2 consumption, thereby providing the government with a
consumption-smoothing motive to reduce the period 1 tax rate relative to the period 2 tax
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rate. On the other hand, when the period 1 tax rate is positive, a reduction in period 1
labour supply shrinks the overall tax base. In order for the government to remain solvent,
therefore, the average tax rate across periods 1 and 2 must rise.
Similarly to how the eect of a price change on demand can be decomposed into a
substitution and an income eect, we can decompose the eect of a change in labour
supply on the optimal tax rate by rewriting the slope of the tax policy function (2.13) as
follows:
dτ (n1,B1)
dn1
= (1 − τ1) f
′(n1)u ′′(·)
f (n1)
(
u ′′(·) + βR2V ′′(·)
) − τ1z1 f ′(n1)dτ (n1,B1)
dB1
.
e rst term captures the consumption-smoothing eect, which is unambiguously
positive (meaning a reduction in labour supply prompts a reduction in the tax rate i.e.
that scal policy is countercyclical). e second term captures the tax-base eect, which
operates through the impact of a change in labour supply on the total scal resources
available to the government. It is therefore no accident that the size of the tax-base eect
is linked to the eect of a change in the inherited debt stock on the optimal tax rate,
dτ (n1,B1)/dB1.
e relative strength of the tax-base and consumption-smoothing eects will deter-
mine the cyclicality of the government’s optimal scal policy. When the consumption-
smoothing eect dominates, scal policy will be countercyclical and the tax policy func-
tion will be upward sloping. Noting that the size of both eects depends on the short-run
tax rate τ1, which itself depends positively on the inherited debt level B1 as per Lemma 2,
we can see that the cyclicality of scal policy will depend on the inherited debt level.
However, the eect of inherited debt on the cyclicality of scal policy is not guaranteed
to be monotonic in all cases. is potential non-monotonicity means that there may not
necessarily be a cut-o level of debt above which scal policy switches from being coun-
tercyclical to procyclical. Nevertheless, Proposition 6 guarantees that scal policy will
always be countercyclical over the relevant range of labour supply when inherited debt
is below the threshold B∗1, ensuring a unique equilibrium. Similarly, Proposition 7 guar-
antees that there will be multiple equilibria (which requires that scal policy is at least
locally procyclical) whenever inherited debt exceeds the maximum rollover threshold Bˆ1.
Note that the sign of the tax-base eect depends on whether the period 1 tax rate is
positive or negative. is provides the intuition behind the result in Lemma 3 that the tax
policy function is upward sloping whenever the tax rate is negative. With a negative tax
rate (i.e. a labour subsidy), a reduction in labour supply actually reduces the scal burden
on the government. is reverses the usual sign of the tax-base eect, meaning it reinforces
rather than counteracts the consumption-smoothing eect. With both eects acting in
the same countercyclical direction, the government’s scal policy will be unambiguously
countercyclical whenever the short-run tax rate is negative.
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2.4 Example with Closed-Form Solutions
In this section we present an analytical example of the class of economies described pre-
viously, and clearly highlight the general result of section 2.3.
We adopt the following specication. In period 1, self-employed households convert
labour eort into output using the following production function:
y1 = z1n
α
1 , α > 0,
where α captures returns to scale. e government inherits a stock of debt B1 owed to
foreigners, chooses a proportional income tax rate τ1 and issues an amount of bonds B2
(again to foreigners) at the risk-free interest rate R.
Period 2, the long run, is an endowment economy in which the government levies
lump-sum taxes. e per-capita endowment of output is y2, and to economize on notation
we normalize period 2 government expenditure, G2, to zero.18
e representative household’s lifetime utility is given by:
U (c1,n1,c2) = u (c1) − д(n1) + βu (c2),
where instantaneous consumption utility is given by
u (ct ) =
c1−σt
1 − σ , σ ∈ (0,1)
in both periods, and the disutility from labour eort in period 1 is given by
д(n1) =
n
γ
1
γ
, γ > 0.
Substituting the budget constraint c1 = (1−τ1)y1 and the production function into the
objective function and solving the household’s rst-order condition yields the following
expression for optimal labour supply:
n(τ1) =
(
α ((1 − τ1)z1)1−σ
) 1
γ −α (1−σ ) .
e government faces the usual budget constraint (2.6). With lump-sum taxation in
period 2, the natural borrowing limit B¯2 in (2.7) is given by the long-run endowment y2,
since long-run consumption c2 = y2 −B2 cannot be negative. e government’s continua-
tion utilityV (B2) from issuing an amount of debt B2 is simply households’ utilityu (y2−B2)
of consuming the amount le over aer lump-sum taxes are levied on the endowment to
pay o the debt. It follows immediately that conditions (2.8) and (2.9) on the continuation
utility function are satised.19
18is normalization is innocuous because with lump-sum taxes in period 2, an increase inG2 is equivalent
to a decrease in y2.
19Formally, V ′(B2) = −u ′(y2 − B2) = −(y2 − B2)−σ < 0, V ′′(B2) = u ′′(y2 − B2) = −σ (y2 − B2)−1−σ < 0
and limB2→B¯2 V
′(B2) = limB2→y2 u ′(y2 − B2) = limc2→0 c−σ2 = +∞.
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e maximum rollover threshold level of inherited debt, above which the government
must collect revenue in period 1 in order to remain solvent, is given by:
Bˆ1 = B¯2/R −G1 = y2/R −G1. (2.14)
2.4.1 Inherited Debt and the Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy
Solving the government’s optimization problem yields the following tax policy function:
τ (n1,B1) =
(βR)1/σ
R + (βR)1/σ
− R (Bˆ1 − B1)(
R + (βR)1/σ
)
z1n
α
1
. (2.15)
is solution allows us to characterize precisely how the cyclicality of scal policy
depends on the inherited level of debt.
Proposition 9. e cyclicality of scal policy depends on the inherited debt level B1 as fol-
lows:
dτ (n1,B1)
dn1
=
R (Bˆ1 − B1)α(
R + (βR)1/σ
)
z1n
1+α
1

> 0 (countercyclical) if B1 < Bˆ1
= 0 (acyclical) if B1 = Bˆ1
< 0 (procyclical) if B1 > Bˆ1.
Accordingly, the equilibrium of the economy is unique if and only if B1 < Bˆ1, and scal policy
traps may emerge for high levels of inherited debt B1.
Proof. Dierentiation of (2.15) and application of Propositions 6 and 7. 
In the proof of Proposition 7, we saw the general result that when public debt is above
the maximum rollover threshold level Bˆ1, the government’s tax policy function must be at
least locally procyclical. Proposition 9 shows that there is a starker relationship between
the level of public debt and the cyclicality of scal policy in this particular case. For levels
of debt above Bˆ1, scal policy is procyclical for all values of labour supply.
Since for any given value of inherited debt B1 the government’s tax policy function is
monotonic, we can guarantee that there is a unique cuto value of B1, below which there
will be a unique equilibrium and above which there will be two equilibria.20 e three
cases are illustrated in Figure 2.5. In panel (a), debt is below the threshold Bˆ1 and so the
tax policy function is upward sloping for all values of labour supply. It therefore crosses
the labour supply function just once, ensuring a unique equilibrium. Panel (b) shows that
the equilibrium is also unique when inherited debt is equal to the threshold Bˆ1 and the tax
policy function is horizontal. Whenever inherited debt exceeds this threshold, as in panel
(c), the tax policy function is downward sloping for all values of labour supply and there
are two equilibria.
Looking at equation (2.14) we can see that the threshold value of debt does not depend
on contemporaneous parameters, such as productivity z1, but only on future variables,
20is is true whenever the tax policy function is monotonic for all values of B1, not just for the particular
example we consider here.
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Figure 2.5: Inherited Debt and the Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy
such as scal capacity y2. Although an increase in productivity reduces the optimal tax
rate for a given level of labour supply, it cannot eliminate the possibility of scal policy
traps. No maer how high is productivity, if debt is above the maximum rollover threshold
then scal policy will be procyclical. is supports the idea that future scal capacity is
essential in steering the economy away from scal policy traps.
2.5 Robustness
So far, we have constrained the choice set of the government by assuming exogenous
government spending and not allowing the possibility of defaulting on debt. Further, we
ruled out the possibility for households to smooth consumption themselves by accessing
international capital markets. ese assumptions imposed strong restrictions on the scal
capacity of the country. ese elements gave rise to the key result of the analysis, namely
that the level of inherited debt is decisive in inducing procyclical scal policy and paving
the way for a self-fullling scal crisis. In this section we relax these assumptions and
investigate the robustness of our result.
2.5.1 Endogenous Government Spending
Consider a government with a high inherited level of debt. Facing a low value of labour
supply, would the government rather increase its tax rate or reduce government expendi-
ture?
To endogenize the choice of public expenditure, we assume that households derive in-
stantaneous utilityv (G1) from public expenditureG1 by the government. e next Propo-
sition shows that the key result of the baseline model still holds, even if the possibility of
adjusting government expenditure provides the government with some “breathing room”:
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the threshold level of debt is higher, but above this threshold, scal policy is procyclical
and there is still the risk of scal policy traps. We adapt the analytical specication in-
troduced in section 2.4 above and assume that v (G1) =
G1−σ1
1−σ . Formally, given (n1,B1), the
government solves:
max
τ1,G1,B2
u
(
(1 − τ1)z1 f (n1)
)
− д(n1) +v (G1) + βu (y2 − B2)
subject to the usual government budget constraint (2.6) and borrowing constraint (2.7).
Note that with endogenousG1, the maximum rollover threshold level of debt becomes:
Bˆ1 = B¯2/R = y2/R,
because the government has the option of seing G1 = 0.
e solution to the government’s maximization problem gives the following tax policy
function:
τ (n1,B1) =
R + (βR)1/σ
2R + (βR)1/σ
− R (Bˆ1 − B1)(
2R + (βR)1/σ
)
z1n
α
1
. (2.16)
Proposition 10. e cyclicality of scal policy depends on the inherited debt level B1 as
follows:
dτ (n1,B1)
dn1
=
R (Bˆ1 − B1)α(
2R + (βR)1/σ
)
z1n
1+α
1

> 0 (countercyclical) if B1 < Bˆ1
= 0 (acyclical) if B1 = Bˆ1
< 0 (procyclical) if B1 > Bˆ1.
Accordingly, the equilibrium of the economy is unique if and only if B1 < Bˆ1, and scal policy
traps may emerge for high levels of inherited debt B1.
Proof. Dierentiation of (2.16) and application of Propositions 6 and 7. 
Intuitively, when G1 and c1 are complements, the government will optimally choose
to reduce G1 in proportion with c1 when labour supply n1 decreases and the country is
poorer. is allows the government to raise the tax rate by less than in the case with
exogenous government expenditure. Nevertheless, once the government is above its short-
run borrowing limit, it will have to raise the tax rate, preserving the risk of scal policy
traps.
2.5.2 Allowing for Default on Newly Issued Debt
In our baseline model, we assume that the government is commied to repaying its debts
in full in period 2. is commitment implies the limit B¯2 to the amount of debt the gov-
ernment can issue in period 1 (see equation (2.7)). is debt issuance limit, together with
the tax-base eect that becomes stronger as the government approaches it, causes optimal
scal policy to be procyclical when the inherited debt level is high.
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We now relax the hard solvency constraint and allow the government to choose strate-
gically in period 2 whether or not to repay its debts. We show that this does not eliminate
the possibility of self-fullling scal crises. In fact, the lack of commitment to debt re-
payement, i.e. the prospect of default in period 2, tightens the borrowing constraint in
period 1. is in turn decreases the threshold level of debt Bˆ1 above which the economy
is susceptible to scal policy traps.
Stochastic Long-Run Output and Strategic Default
To develop this idea, we amend the model as follows. Let long-run output y2 be stochastic,
distributed uniformly on
[
y
2
,y¯2
]
. Denote F (·) the cumulative distribution function of y2.
As in section 2.4 above, the government can use lump-sum taxes in period 2 to repay its
debt B2, in which case period 2 consumption will be c2 = y2−B2. If instead the government
chooses to default in period 2, the economy suers a proportional output lossδ2, so period 2
consumption becomes c2 = (1 − δ2)y2.
e default cost δ2 can be interpreted as the government’s degree of commitment to
repaying its debts in period 2. e extreme case of δ2 = 1 induces a strong commitment
to repay and captures the hard solvency constraint assumed up to now. At the opposite
extreme of δ2 = 0, default is costless, so the government would always default. Given out-
standing bonds B2, it is optimal for the government to repay its debts in period 2 whenever
output y2 satises:
y2 − B2 ≥ (1 − δ2)y2.
is relation gives the threshold yˆ2 (B2), realizations ofy2 below which the government
defaults on its bonds B2:
yˆ2 (B2) = B2/δ2. (2.17)
Risk-neutral foreign investors anticipate the strategic default decision of the govern-
ment. Accordingly, the price schedule q(B2) satises the following no-arbitrage condition:
q(B2) =
1 − F (yˆ2 (B2))
R
, (2.18)
where R is the risk-free interest rate. In this expression, the credit risk associated with
the issuance of bonds B2 is captured by F
(
yˆ2 (B2)
)
, the probability that long-run output
will be below the default threshold yˆ2 (B2). e possibility of strategic default can lead to
indeterminacy in the price schedule (2.18), as studied in Calvo (1988) and Cooper (2015). As
our focus is on the occurrence of scal policy traps rather than self-fullling increases in
sovereign risk premia, whenever several prices satisfy the price schedule (2.18) we assume
that investors select the “fundamental” outcome with the lowest risk premium. In this
case, the price of debt q(B2) is decreasing in the amount of bonds B2 issued, reecting the
increased probability of default.
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Lack of Commitment to Repay Reduces Borrowing Limit
We are now ready to prove that despite its capacity to default on debt in period 2, the
government may still be susceptible to scal policy traps. As in our baseline model, gov-
ernment borrowing between period 1 and 2 is constrained. is is turn induces a maximum
level of inherited debt Bˆ1 such that the government can roll over its obligations without
having to collect tax revenue in period 1. As in the baseline model, the economy is under
the threat of scal policy traps whenever inherited debt B1 is above this threshold. Inter-
estingly, this threshold is increasing in the commitment parameter δ2. In other words, the
less commied a country is to repaying its debt, the lower is the debt threshold at which
it becomes vulnerable to scal policy traps.
Proposition 11. Whenever the government can default on its debt in period 2, there is a debt
rollover threshold Bˆ1 above which the country is subject to scal policy traps. e threshold
is increasing in the output loss parameter δ2 (i.e. an increase in commitment increases debt
capacity).
Proof. We rst demonstrate that there is a maximum amount of revenue that the govern-
ment can raise in period 1, and that this amount is decreasing in δ2. e revenue raised
in period 1 by issuing B2 bonds is q(B2)B2, where the price schedule q(B2) satises (2.18).
Using the default threshold (2.17), resources from debt issuance are:
q(B2)B2 =
1 − F (B2/δ2)
R
B2.
e right-hand side is equal to 0 for B2 = 0 and for B2 = δ2y¯2, and is strictly positive for
any value of B2 in between. Hence the right-hand side reaches a maximum for B2 = B¯2 ∈
(0,δ2y¯2). e maximum period 1 revenue from debt issuance is therefore q(B¯2)B¯2. Since
the price of debt is strictly increasing in δ2, the revenue collected q(B2)B2 is also increasing
in δ2, and so is the maximum amount that can be collected.
As in (2.11) above, there is a maximum amount of debt Bˆ1 that can be rolled over
without raising any tax revenue in period 1. is threshold is increasing in the maximum
amount of revenue that can be raised by issuing new debt, and therefore in δ2:
Bˆ1 = q(B¯2)B¯2 −G1.
If the stock of inherited debt B1 exceeds the maximum rollover threshold Bˆ1, then as
in our baseline model the government will have to gather revenue in period 1. Indeed, to
remain within this limit the government must set a short-run tax rate at least equal to
τ (n1,B1) =
B1 − Bˆ1
z1 f (n1)
.
It follows that, as before, when B1 > Bˆ1 the optimal tax policy function is at least locally
procyclical, and Proposition 7 applies.

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e intuition behind this result is as follows. As the default cost δ2 falls, investors
know that the government will default in more states of the world in period 2 because
it faces a lower penalty for doing so. is causes them to charge a higher risk premium,
thereby reducing the amount of revenue the government can raise in period 1 by issuing
new debt.
Overall, allowing the government to default on its debts in period 2 does not, therefore,
eliminate the possibility of self-fullling scal crises.
2.5.3 Private Access to International Markets
In our benchmark model, we made the simplifying assumption that households lived hand-
to-mouth and could neither save nor borrow between periods 1 and 2. Here we consider the
polar opposite case in which households have full access to international capital markets
at the risk-free rate R.21 Allowing households to borrow and save across time allows them
to smooth consumption when taxes change. Are scal policy traps still possible in this
environment?
Whereas in section 2.4 we modelled period 2 as an endowment economy with lump-
sum taxation, here we model period 2 as a production economy with endogenous labour
supply. Under this set-up, labour taxation in period 2 inuences the labour supply decision.
is modelling approach is aimed at avoiding redundancy between public and private in-
tertemporal decisions. Further, we assume that the government cannot tax saving or con-
sumption directly. As we shall demonstrate below, when households can privately smooth
consumption across time, the combination of an inelastic short-run tax base and an elas-
tic long-run tax base leads the government to tax the short-run tax base at 100 percent.
Fiscal policy is determinate but the outcome is unambiguously worse, since households
use international markets to avoid taxes, which in turn induces the government to set the
highest tax rate possible.
e timing is as follows. In period 1, households choose their borrowing, denoted a,
and their short-run labour supply n1.22 Having observed n1 and a, the government then
sets a short-run tax rate τ1 and issues new debt B2. In period 2, households supply labour
n2, clear their borrowing position and consume. e government sets a tax rate τ2 to
meet its budget constraint and clear its debt position. e solution is derived by backward
induction.
Period 2 consumption is given by c2 = (1 − τ2)z2 f (n2) − Ra. With the disutility of
labour captured by the function д(·), households solve the following problem:
VH (a) = max
n2
u
(
(1 − τ2)z2 f (n2) − Ra
)
− д(n2). (2.19)
Optimal period 2 labour supply n2 (τ2,a) is implicitly dened by households’ intratem-
21We thank Russell Cooper for hinting at this extension.
22Saving is denoted by a negative value of a.
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poral rst-order condition:
(1 − τ2)z2 f (n2)u ′(c2) = д′(n2). (2.20)
e government’s period 2 budget constraint implicitly denes τ2 (a,B2):23
τ2z2 f (n2) = B2, (2.21)
where n2 ≡ n2 (τ2,a) is given by (2.20).
Now, in period 1, given τ1 and τ2, households solve the following problem:24
max
n1,a
u
(
(1 − τ1)z1 f (n1) + a
)
− д(n1) + βVH (a),
whereVH (a) is the value of the period 2 problem (2.19) when the household has borrowed
a. e household intertemporal rst-order condition is therefore given by:
u ′
(
(1 − τ1)z1 f (n1) + a
)
= −βV ′H (a)
u ′(c1) = βRu ′(c2). (2.22)
Unlike households, the government internalizes the eect of its period 1 choices on
the tax rate in period 2. When the government issues debt B2, its continuation value is
given by:
VG (a,B2) = u
((
1 − τ2 (a,B2)
)
z2 f
(
n2
(
τ2 (a,B2)
))
− Ra
)
− д
(
n2
(
τ2 (a,B2)
))
.
e government’s period 1 problem is therefore:
max
τ1
u ((1 − τ1)z1 f (n1) + a) − д(n1) + βVG (a,B2),
where government debt issuance is given by the budget constraint B2 = R
(
B1−τ1z1 f (n1)
)
.
e government’s intertemporal rst-order condition is:
u ′((1 − τ1)z1 f (n1) + a) = −βRdVG (a,B2)
dB2
u ′(c1) = βRu ′(c2)z2 f (n2)
dτ2 (a,B2)
dB2
. (2.23)
Comparing the household intratemporal rst-order condition (2.22) with that of the
government (2.23), we see that they dier by the term z2 f (n2) dτ2 (a,B2)dB2 , which captures
the distortionary eects of taxation in period 2, internalized by the government. is
dierence leads to the striking implication of this extension of our model:
23As in Section 2.5.2, in order to abstract away from other sources of coordination failures, we select the
tax rate on the le-hand side of the Laer curve in period 2. As above, period 2 government spending is
normalized to zero.
24Although the tax rates τ1 and τ2 are determined by aggregate household borrowing and labour supply
decisions, each individual household takes them as given when making its own decisions.
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Proposition 12. When households have access to international capital markets and taxation
is distortionary in period 2, there is a unique equilibrium with τ1 = 1, n1 = 0 and a > 0.
Proof. Comparing the household intertemporal rst-order condition (2.22) and the gov-
ernment’s intertemporal rst-order condition (2.23), we see that the right-hand side of the
laer contains an additional term z2 f (n2) dτ2 (a,B2)dB2 > 0. is means that only one of these
expressions can hold in equilibrium. Households’ period 2 labour eort n2 is unbounded
above and they are commied to repay their debts Ra in full, so unlike the government
they face no borrowing constraints. is ensures that households’ intertemporal rst-
order condition holds in equilibrium and the government’s does not.
If the government’s intertemporal rst-order condition does not hold, then the tax
rate τ1 it sets must be one of the corner solutions. Given that the extra term on the right-
hand side of the government’s intertemporal rst-order condition is positive, then if the
households’ rst-order condition holds, the government wants to increase the term on
the le-hand side, u ′(c1). Since u ′′(·) < 0, this means the government wants to decrease
c1 = (1 − τ1)z1 f (n1), which it does by seing τ1 as high as possible.
Given τ1 = 1, it is optimal for households to supply n1 = 0. Finally, since u ′(0) = +∞,
intertemporal optimization by households requires a > 0. 
In contrast to the baseline model with hand-to-mouth households, the equilibrium
outcome when households have access to perfect private capital markets is characterized
by a unique tax rate in period 1, independent of the level of inherited debt B1. Still, the
equilibrium outcome is unambiguously worse, since no production occurs in period 1 and
the whole burden of taxation and debt repayment is postponed to period 2.
e intuition behind this seemingly perverse result is that households’ access to capital
markets undermines the government’s consumption-smoothing motive for keeping the
period 1 tax rate low. Households then avoid high period 1 taxes by cuing their labour
supply, and borrow to preserve their period 1 consumption level. e implication is that
the absence of perfect private capital markets is benecial in this environment, because
it partially compensates for the government’s inability to commit not to tax the inelastic
short-run tax base excessively.
2.6 Conclusion
e recent rise (and subsequent fall) of sovereign debt spreads in the euro area periphery
has prompted renewed interest in multiple equilibria and self-fullling crises. Yet it was
not only countries facing increased borrowing costs that pursued contractionary scal
policies during the Great Recession.
In this paper we have proposed a potential explanation for why governments might
pursue procyclical scal policies despite not facing increased sovereign risk premia. When
the inherited stock of public debt is suciently high, concerns about the burden of future
taxes may overwhelm concerns about preserving consumption in the face of a decline
in output, making even optimal scal policy procyclical. is procyclicality unleashes the
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possibility of a dierent kind of crisis, fuelled not by self-fullling fears of higher sovereign
spreads but by self-fullling fears of a decline in output.
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